 |
Aghasi Yenokian
Director of the Armenian Center for Political and International Studies (Armenia) |
Internal political and social processes in the countries of
the South Caucasus
The cycle of the pursuit of legitimacy
According to Kant's theory of "democratic peace", democratic states do not
wage war on each other. Consequently, world peace will be possible when all states
are democratic. This theory was reanimated by the American liberal school after
the end of the cold war. Perhaps precisely because of this theory, perhaps simply
because a democratic society is the most efficient medium for the self-organization
of a people, this very path of development was recommended to the states created
in the post-Soviet region.
The post-Soviet states apprehended the recommendation in different ways. In
Turkmenistan, for example, it was bluntly rejected and a typical totalitarian
state was created, with its cult of personality, "father of the nation"
and other corresponding attributes. The Baltic states treated the advice with
respect and over a short period of time created stable political systems and efficient
economies (without natural resources), and began thinking about integration into
the European family of nations.
As to the Caucasus, this same advice was perceived as a joke: disguised as
elections, human rights and a market economy, the creation of a democracy with
"national characteristics" began. The first elections in the Transcaucasian
states were more or less democratic; new parliaments and heads of state were for
the most part elected on a democratic basis - by a majority of votes.
However, it is important to note that Ter-Petrossian, Elchibey and Gamsakhurdia
were charismatic leaders of national movements, and their election was not rational.
The choice was based on a nationalistic burst of democratization and the liberation
movement. In subsequent years these countries have fallen into a vicious circle
of pseudo-democracy and pseudo-elections. In contrast to the first democratic
elections of 1991 (held in accordance with the "bad" Soviet laws, but
unambiguously approved of in Armenia), the results of all subsequent elections
were considered falsified and the governments formed on their basis semi- or entirely
illegitimate.
The activity of these governments has been highly complicated, since those
who have sinned once can no longer be honest and good. They must hold onto the
power they have usurped with all their might. This is exactly where the interrelation
between the legitimacy of government and the lack of settlement of conflicts is
manifested. It should be emphasized that the 1998 coup d'etat in Armenia, as result
of which Robert Kocharian became president, was perpetrated under the slogan "Not
one step back on the issue of Karabakh". This was in essence a rejection
of the resolution of the problem. The question of the legitimacy of Kocharian's
power is based on this very rejection. In his subsequent actions he has carefully
imitated a quest for a way to settle the Karabakh conflict, and thereby delayed
doing so: any proposed or even potential solution must be based on mutual concessions,
and any concession on the part of Kocharian would shake and weaken his legitimacy.
The ordinary citizen argues, "If Kocharian achieves an agreement on the Karabakh
problem, he has nothing more to do in power and he must leave; if he doesn't reach
an agreement, he must leave all the more, he will never accomplish his primary
task". In essence, in the existing situation he has no choice but to delay
the resolution of the problem, which he has managed to do throughout one presidential
term.
On the threshold of the presidential elections of 2003, this strategy takes
an especially dangerous turn, and as before, the slogan "Not one step back
on the issue of Karabakh" must be his main playing card. Only in this way,
by employing all his administrative levers, can he stay in power for another five
years. But no matter what, from the legal point of view, Kocharian cannot be a
legitimate president in Armenia (for the ten years preceding the presidential
elections of 1998 he was not a citizen of Armenia and did not reside in Armenia,
as the Constitution requires). In other words, if Kocharian is reelected, on the
one hand Armenia will again have an illegitimate president, and on the other hand
he will try again to delay the resolution of the problem for the next five-year
period.
A particular feature of the Transcaucasian states is the absence of a significant
middle class, the expression of whose reasonable, clearly formulated interests
is considered to be the basis of a democratic system. The leaders of the states
of the region who came to power as a result of even the most exact vote counting,
without falsifications, are obliged to provide their electorate with "bread
and circuses." And the greatest show is war. Naturally, nobody will openly
advocate war, but nationalism has become part and parcel of the rhetoric of the
political elites of Transcaucasia. In the opinion of experts, the last meeting
between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which took place in August 2002,
and about which the mediators were informed in advance, was devoted to a joint
discussion of election techniques. It is not surprising that after the meeting,
high-level officials in Armenia and Azerbaijan began issuing war cries.
Why everybody wants into Europe
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world, Europe faced
the problem of creating a new system of security. This began to be resolved through
integration. In the European vision of the future of the region, the attitude
became apparent that security is possible only through the comprehensive development
of the states of Transcaucasia, not just through the strengthening of military-political
systems, but also through the stabilization of the economy, and the predictability
of governments. Existing European structures were enlarged and consolidated, new
ones were created, and procedures were elaborated and stages determined for the
admittance of the new independent states into these structures.
Europe has contributed to the processes of integration in three directions:
- Methodological donorship - standards, experience in reform, etc.
- Financial donorship, promoting the realization of these reforms
- Control over the fulfillment of recommendations and over the spending of financial
contributions through monitoring.
Nevertheless, within the security system of the South Caucasus, the element
of cooperation among Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan is missing. The fragile security
institutions of the CIS cannot fill this gap, and other international and regional
organizations do not pursue the objective of becoming sufficiently effective in
the sphere of security. Only Armenia is a member of a CIS military-political structure
(Collective Security Treaty -DKB). With the presence of American military bases
in Central Asia, for whom, in many respects, the DKB was devised, the system has
become an apparently fictive institution.
Today, the principle of mutual containment, as well as the delicate balance
of interests of the superpowers, lies at the base of the security of the South
Caucasus. On such a base it is very difficult to achieve cooperation and integration.
From this perspective the role of Europe is invaluable, since it can not only
provide a "roof" of security, but also serve as an example of cooperation.
For Europe unites old geopolitical foes and rivals, who nevertheless cooperate
and understand that this is far more profitable than animosity.
The role of Europe in the process of democratic reforms in the region should
be especially noted. As an example, we may examine the recommendations concerning
amendments to Armenian legislation put forward by the Commission on Political
Affairs of Council of Europe. The implementation of these recommendations is a
necessary condition for Armenia's membership in this organization. The Armenian
mass media often misrepresent the issue, stating that Europe demands from us freedom
of action only for sexual minorities and Jehovah's Witnesses; however it is a
sufficiently considerable list of conditions, which includes the reformation of
the election system and of internal affairs, implying the adoption of new laws
on political parties, NGOs, and the status of state employees, the reform of the
whole system of local governance, and radical reform in the realm of human rights.
The idea of such tough requirements is to create sufficiently favorable conditions
for democratic development, since through them guarantees are created to free
administrative units and the most vulnerable strata of society from the dictate
of the highest leadership. Indeed, if one compares the other laws approved by
the National Assembly over the last two years with the laws adopted in accordance
with the requirements of the Council of Europe, it is obvious that in contrast
to these, all of the other laws are aimed at strengthening and toughening the
presidential power. So-called "Europeanized" laws, in perspective, will
impose such serious limitations on the government that many are puzzled - why,
on the whole, does Kocharian need this European membership? But he endeavors,
as far as possible, to make use of the hooks and loopholes in the reforms in order
to consolidate his position under the veil of democracy. A glaring example is
the taking off the air of the opposition TV station A1+ through manipulation of
the new Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting.
It is clear that for the citizens and politicians of the South Caucasus, European
values are, so far, remote, all too abstract notions. Politicians, for example,
refer to them or simply recall them during demagogic lunges at their opponents.
However there is a very real hope that the European values of socio-political
and economic development will actually become a basis for the development of our
states. First of all, our peoples were "expelled" from this system against
their will; they were under the pressure of the communist regime, behind the iron
curtain. Second, the very process of the development of Europe today, the process
of European integration, in which nations with absolutely different pasts, fates,
and mentalities strive for a common family, raises our hopes. And, third, most
importantly, so-called "European values" are not abstract, theoretical
concepts, but concrete things, based on natural human rights. In this sense, European
assistance to our countries is sufficiently effective, and, by the way, reflects
the interests of Europe itself.
Society aside from "social processes"
The societies of the South Caucasian states are quite estranged from the state
for three reasons: people do not have faith in fair elections, they are, on the
whole, poor, and the utmost apathy reigns here.
The dismal experience of recent elections, when the results were shaped according
to a scenario elaborated in advance, drove the electorate to the realization that
their votes mean absolutely nothing, and therefore, either it is not worth it
to vote at all, or they should simply sell their vote for a kilogram of sugar
or a loaf of bread. It is not surprising, that the technique of pre-election bribery
began to take root successively in Armenia immediately after the first successful
tricks during the 1995 parliamentary elections. By the time of the 1996 presidential
elections, both candidates - Levon Ter-Petrossian and Vazgen Manukian -were not
only handing out pre-election bribes but were casting forged ballot-papers into
the ballot boxes. As to the 1998 presidential elections, the evolution of the
violations of the Electoral Code in Armenia had come to the point where a person
who did not have Armenian citizenship became a candidate for the post of president
of Armenia.
Naturally the outcome of such "elections" depends not on the elector,
but on the members of election commissions, or more precisely, on those who appoint
these members. The lack of trust in the power of one's vote, in the right to vest
one's portion of power in those one trusts, is not the result of civil illiteracy,
but of the sad experience undergone by the people in recent history.
According to official statistics, 51 per cent-- and according to other, more
objective estimates, 85 per cent -- of the population of Armenia live below the
poverty line. A portion live off their relatives residing abroad (according to
various data, the total amount of money coming into Armenia this way is equal
to the annual budget of the country, $300 million). Naturally, such electors are,
at best, interested in what is happening not in Armenia but in the countries their
money comes from. And at worst, such electors will be interested in nothing related
to politics at all. Similarly, people who are deprived of even this possibility
of maintaining their existence and live in extremely miserable conditions do not
care about politics.
Most probably, these people will either not waste their time on such "stupidity"
as elections, or will easily fall for the bait of "nice and honest"
election promises. Not surprisingly, during the 1999 parliamentary elections,
without any particular efforts from above, many votes were received by the coalition
"Law and Solidarity", which based its election campaign on reckless
nationalism and slogans like "to jail, to execute, to hang the bloodsuckers
of the working-people.
The apathy prevailing throughout the population of the South Caucasus is a
phenomenon accompanying the breaking of the foundations, the post-revolutionary
processes. But it is also a consequence of two other factors - poverty and falsifications
of the elections. In order to understand the depth of the apathy reigning in Armenia
today, it is enough to just browse through the Armenian press. It is either faceless,
in order not to incur the anger of the government, or scandalous, in order to
stimulate the interest of the reader. There is no informative press in Armenia.
These three impediments to the real democratization of the society in Armenia--
apathy, poverty, and falsifications-- create a certain vicious circle: people
are poor because they don't fight for their rights; people don't fight because
they are indifferent to everything; people are indifferent to everything because
of their poverty. It is hard to imagine or to locate an exit from this circle.
However paradoxical it may sound, the key is in the hands of the government. They
must either act on behalf of the prosperity of the country, and not in their own
interests, or they must act in the name of their own interests, but through putting
the country's affairs in order. The government, at least, cannot permit falsifications
during the elections.
The very holding of fair elections may become the way out of this vicious circle.
In contrast to the task of overcoming poverty and apathy within society, which
is impossible to achieve over night, the organization of fair elections is a perfectly
possible thing. The political will of the government itself, and the utilization
of all administrative resources are needed for this. As it has been done in Bulgaria
and Romania. These countries had almost the same starting conditions as we do,
but the governments over there have not fallen for the temptation of self-reproduction
through electoral machinations. I think that in the near future they will embark
on the path of normal development.
