Arif Yunusov Chair of the Department of Conflict Resolution and Migration, Institute of Peace and Democracy (Baku)

Because of the idea of "long suffering", the process of the "Armenization" of Azerbaijani society is taking place

- How likely are dramatic advances in the settlement of the Karabakh problem after the presidential elections? Is the resumption of military operations on the battlefront - which is being much talked about, and which the opposition forces in Azerbaijan persistently demand - possible?

- Dramatic advances in the settlement of the Karabakh problem are unlikely not only after the presidential elections, but also within at least the next few years. That is why I personally have always been skeptical about the optimistic statements of the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk group regarding the possibility of settling the conflict the very near future ("by the end of this year", "in the course of one or two years at the most", etc). The same concerns the recent statement by Rudolf Perina, the American Co-Chairman, that the Karabakh conflict is 80-percent settled, and only 20 percent remains to be settled. And this won't take much time. Behind such superficial statements lies an incomprehension of the entire complexity of the nature of the Karabakh conflict, and the deep-laid processes that influence its course and development.

At the same time, the resumption of military operations on the front-line is quite realistic if the opposition forces come to power. The internal policy of the government has collapsed; the country is experiencing a most acute social and economic crisis that, in many respects, was generated by the Karabakh conflict. The huge army of refugees (and not only them) has gotten tired of waiting for a settlement, which has been too long delayed. Under such conditions for radicalization, the situation is predictable. And after the opposition comes to power, the resumption of military operations will also be quite natural. It (the opposition) will attempt to put into practice what a great many people, especially the refugees, wish for.

- What, in your opinion, hinders the Karabakh settlement, and is it possible at all?

- The problem is not that the sides have differing views on the cause and the character of the conflict. As a matter of fact, this is quite normal, so it should be. The problem is different: both sides are convinced of the uniqueness of the conflict and in many respects proceed from this. Hence, the constant accusations against the mediators and the whole world who, they say, aren't seriously occupied with the resolution of such a unique conflict. In reality, this is a quite ordinary ethnic conflict between nations who in the 20th century began to seek their place in the world and to create nation-states. In modern history one can find lots of examples of conflicts between neighboring peoples who were building nation-states and were dragged into conflict over some border territory. Suffice it to recall that France and Germany were in conflict for almost 130 years over whom Alsace and Lorraine belonged to. One can also bring up the problem of Kashmir, between Pakistan and India, and many other conflicts in Africa and Asia. It is also absolutely natural that the side that suffered defeat in the war is getting ready for a new war in the hope of revenge. In this regard, declarations about the growth of warlike sentiments in Azerbaijan against the background of peace-loving Armenia, etc. are absolutely unfounded.

If Azerbaijan had occupied 20 percent of the territory of Armenia and Azerbaijani soldiers were located somewhere in Meghri or Idjevan, then the Azerbaijanis would be speaking about peace and the necessity of economic cooperation. But then in Armenia we would have warlike sentiments. If such sentiments were indeed absent in Azerbaijan today it should arouse serious anxiety on the occasion of a deep crisis in the Azerbaijani nation. Therefore, from the point of view of war history, the behavior of the conflicting sides is completely consistent with conventional behavior in such cases. The declarations that the nations are too fatigued to wage war and that the conflict is needed by certain forces inside and outside the countries themselves are unfounded as well. Both nations are in fact tired of conducting military operations-- of fighting at this stage. But they are far from tired of being in conflict; on the contrary, this is just the beginning.

The military history of mankind witnesses that there exist certain cycles within the ability of the human organism to be in a state of conflict. After a certain time - from an average of seven to ten years after the beginning of war - fatigue appears. Even the famous Hundred Years' War (1337-1453) or the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) in Europe, in practice, happened in such intervals. Let us also recall conflicts that have been going on intermittently for decades-- the Indian-Pakistani, Arab-Israeli conflicts or the conflict over Cyprus between Turkey and Greece. Thereby, a conflict is a broader concept, which includes brief periods of military operations and armistices. And when the fatigue from conducting military operations passes, the time for the real, but not at all necessary, beginning of the new war comes. With reference to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, it is clear to see that the period of fatigue of the sides has come. How long it will last depends on a number of factors.

But it does not follow from this that the conflict in the hearts of Armenians and Azerbaijanis has been exhausted, and that wicked, mercenary politicians inside and outside the countries are hindering the settlement of the conflict. No, as long as the conflict is not exhausted in the hearts of the peoples, has not lost its urgency, we will be living on the edge of a volcano and guessing whether there will be a war or not. Soon, it will be almost thirty years that there has been is no war over Cyprus. But there is no peace either, for the conflict in the hearts of the two sides has not been exhausted. I personally do not believe that it will be possible to settle the Karabakh conflict within the next twenty to twenty-five years. But this does not mean that one should sit with arms crossed, waiting for when our nations will take up their weapons again. It is necessary to constantly work to remove the tension in the relations, to develop confidence. After all, the main obstacle in the relations between the two nations today is the overwhelming mutual distrust, and the newly emerged myths and stereotypes about each other.

In reality, the problem of the status of Nagorno Karabakh is, in many respects, a technical-organizational matter. After all, there already exists one autonomous republic in Azerbaijan. Is it difficult to tolerate the existence of one more, even if with the broadest authority? No, the fact is, the parties simply do not trust each other. If the Azerbaijani government says tomorrow that 2+2=4, will the Armenians, especially the Karabakh Armenians, agree with that? This was said by the Azerbaijanis, you know, and hence it is probably a dirty trick. And vice versa, the Azerbaijanis will think the same. But if the sides trust each other, then it will not be such an important factor to define the powers of each side.

Today there is more negative energy within Azerbaijani society, and, in essence, the Azerbaijanis are experiencing the same processes as the Armenian society was in 1950s-1970s. Thus, because of the idea of "long suffering," in its own way, a process of "Armenization" is taking place. If we cast aside the propagandistic myth about the "peaceful" nature of the demands of the Karabakh Armenians, which obviously does not correspond to the truth (three months before the official beginning of the conflict, in November 1987, the first hundreds of Azerbaijanis fled the Kapan region of Armenia; in January 1988 the number of refugees from Armenia exceeded 4,000, and they were mostly stationed in the environs of Sumgait), then it is clear that the Armenians had more negative energy then, and perhaps, even without realizing it, craved a conflict, and started one. We may talk about the disproportionate reaction of the Azerbaijanis at that time; nevertheless it was not they who started the conflict. But now the situation has changed to the exact opposite. Now the Azerbaijanis crave a conflict more, and all that remains is to find a pretext.

What can and should be done in such a situation? First, not to aggravate the situation. Meanwhile, against the background of the growth of militarist sentiments in Azerbaijan, the Armenian side all too clearly does not make a compromise, and proceeds from this formula: Nagorno Karabakh must be either independent or part of Armenia. But this is certainly unacceptable for Azerbaijan, and such an uncompromising approach leads only to a similar reaction by the Azerbaijanis, and to a deadlock. And then, it is one step away from war. And the pretext will always be found.

It is also quite clear that the package proposals of the Minsk group will not lead toward anything realistic; on the contrary, they will only freeze the problem, and heat the situation more. In this regard a phased approach, a method of gradual steps towards each other, should be employed in order to build confidence and to establish extensive contacts. An important fact that we pay little attention to is that since 1994, the cease-fire agreement has remained in force. The sides have held on to it, and this is the only conflict where there have been no forces keeping them apart. No peacekeepers are stationed between us. Thus, it is quite obvious that the Nagorno Karabakh population could just as well have lived without the security belt that includes seven adjacent regions. In the coming year or two it is necessary to begin vacating the territories adjacent to Nagorno Karabakh and returning refugees there.

Concurrently, communications should be opened and a common economic zone in the South Caucasus should be established. After people start returning home under security guarantees for all, living side by side, working to improve their well-being, it will be possible to resolve the issue of the status of Nagorno Karabakh. By that time the confidence between the nations will be established. The parties will be cooperating, including economic cooperation, and not confronting each other. When the Armenians started the conflict, they demanded the right of the Armenian community of Nagorno Karabakh to preserve their culture, language, etc. The Azerbaijanis had their slogan: Karabakh is the inalienable territory of Azerbaijan. And it seems to me that in the presence of confidence it will be quite possible to reconcile these two slogans.

But it is also important that in both countries, the real processes of the democratization of society, and the establishment of the civil institutions begin. Only in such a way was it possible to overcome the Franco-German conflict over Alsace and Lorraine, and are many other problems of national minorities in Western Europe being quite successfully resolved. Unfortunately, we do not have democratically elected presidents, we do not have democratic societies, and laws are not working in our countries. And this does not contribute to the settlement of the conflict either.

- Who in fact must make decisions on Karabakh - the leaders of our countries, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Karabakh, the peoples of our countries, our strategic partners?

- The main resolution on Karabakh will be brought about by time, when the conflict loses its acuteness and a generation grows up with different purposes in life. And then the decisions of the leaders of our countries will not meet a hostile reception by the population. Of course, our strategic partners have quite a large influence on the process of the settlement. However, here too, serious changes are possible in time. But, above all, both nations must become ripe for peace.

- What is the "culture of peace" for Azerbaijan, for Armenia, and for Karabakh? Who needs it most?

- All the conflicting nations and sides are in need of the culture of peace; that is why one should not make any differentiation. One should not think that, say, "we, the Armenians, have always wanted, and especially today want peace, and we do not need to learn this culture, but the other side needs it". I assure you that the Azerbaijanis think exactly the same way: "We are a peace loving nation anyway, we sheltered Armenians at one time, and you can see for yourself how those ungrateful people have responded". The "culture of peace" means in the first place a culture of tolerant attitudes toward the other side or other opinions, which somewhat or even greatly differ from conventional opinions. But this should not evoke a negative reaction. Let us take, for example, religious issues. In Armenia they react highly painfully to the emergence of any sectarians, in Azerbaijan they react in the same way to emergence in the country of Christian-Azerbaijanis or Muslim sects. I have offered only one example, but could offer many more.

Interview by Laura Baghdasaryan