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THREE VIEWS  
Emin Makhmudov
Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Zerkalo daily newspaper (Azerbaijan)


The problem of South Caucasian security and integration today

Since they gained independence, the republics of the South Caucasus have seen the emergence of several hotbeds of interethnic conflict, mainly as a result of the former imperial policy of Russia. Russia unscrupulously unified nations inhabiting the region, and set the boundaries among the three main national subjects at its own discretion, while crudely destroying the framework developed over their centuries-old history. For example, some Georgian and Azerbaijani territories were incorporated into Armenia, and autonomous entities were artificially created on the territories of Georgia and Azerbaijan without any historical foundation. Thus, a time bomb was placed in the region and it started to go off in conjunction with the weakening of the empire - the power holding the "detonator" in its hands.

By 1992, all three republics of the South Caucasus were led by people who came to power on the wave of interethnic conflicts.

The present situation is the logical continuation of these processes. If it is very difficult now to talk about regional integration, it is even harder to imagine possibilities for the creation of universal South Caucasian security. Naturally, these two points are interdependent.

Confidence building (in the broad sense of the term) among the South Caucasian republics is the only thing that may lead to the integration and security of the region. This postulate, though rather generalized, must be assumed as a basis for the settlement of regional problems.

The regionalism of the states of the South Caucasus

In the context under consideration, the regionalism of the states of the South Caucasus is practically non-existent. At present, only the rudiments of regionalism are appearing which, first of all, are conditioned by the implementation of international economic projects. As is well known, by virtue of its policy and military aggression against Azerbaijan, Armenia has practically "missed the boat", regarding not only the so-called energy projects, in which Azerbaijan and through it Georgia are taking part, but also the TRACECA (the Great Silk Road) and TAE (trans European-Asian fiber-optical cable) projects.

By virtue of its political-economic situation, Russia has been unable to secure a sound basis for the development of its former "patrimonies". A situation has arisen in which Armenia, precisely because of its pro-Russian orientation, has found itself cut off from the principal source of investments - the West. The position of Azerbaijan - the main South Caucasian country in terms of potential, which has categorically refused to cooperate with Yerevan, has also contributed to this.

In this context, regionalism in foreign policy is being demonstrated by the orientation of official Baku and Tbilisi toward the West. The beginning of large-scale exploitation of the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian basin, where the most active role is played by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, has made necessary the transit of this product via Georgia. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has automatically put the latter in an "off side" position. The involvement of American companies has excluded the possibility of transportation of the hydrocarbon production through the territory of Iran - another main partner of Armenia.

As an example of the incipient regionalism in the foreign policy of Azerbaijan and Georgia we may cite the attitude of Azerbaijan toward the present worsening of Russian-Georgian relations. Alarmed by the situation that has emerged in Georgia, the leadership of Azerbaijan is actively conducting negotiations with Moscow and Washington in an attempt to assist friendly Georgia. This is an indicator that the regionalism in the foreign policy of Azerbaijan first of all emanates from its economic and political interests. Only through such integration does the realization of the necessity to create a regional security system arise. Let me repeat: unfortunately Armenia is at present left out of the scheme of South Caucasian integration and security.

Potentials for the development of a security system in the South Caucasus

Let us examine the four components of a common security system in the region.

First, it is necessary to settle the conflicts and to establish on this basis a regime of mutual trust.

Apparently, this is the most difficult task to accomplish. The situation in the region has worsened, and antagonism has become so strong that it seems impossible to surmount this barrier in the short-term outlook. One reason is the desire of the parties, whose ambitions have been momentarily satisfied, to maintain the status quo at all costs. Such aspirations in Armenia, Abkhazia, Adjaria, and Ossetia can be also explained by the fact that any leader of these territorial entities who attempts to reject so-called "national ideas" may be left with nothing. This was the case, for example, for the ex-president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, who in 1998 appraised the realities and perspectives of settling the Karabakh conflict and attempted to make a compromise.

Further, the resolution of this problem is hindered by the geopolitical hands dealt the same power centers in the region - the US and Russia.

Even if the opposing sides come to a common denominator, quite a long time will be needed to establish economic links and to comprehend common interests.

Second, through the economic development of the states of the region, it is necessary to define approximate, if not common, internal and foreign policy guideposts. The economic development of the South Caucasus may also lead to a higher degree of independence of the republics from "outside factors". In my opinion, Azerbaijan and Georgia are in a more advantageous situation. However, unlike Azerbaijan, which recently is confidently headed toward cooperation with Russia, Georgia has more problems with Russia. In comparison with Georgia, Armenia is from the political point of view (but never from the economic) in a relatively better situation. Having Russia as its principal strategic partner, Armenia has developed fairly good relations with the West. The very same military conflict with Azerbaijan hinders Armenia from developing full-scale economic relations with Western states. Nevertheless, a certain development of the situation in the region, as well as some tendencies within political life, show that prospects for rapprochement in terms of the internal and foreign political guideposts of the states of the region still exist.

Third, the interest of the parties is necessary for the establishment of systems to counteract the "power poles", which dictate their will in the region. The realization of this, taking into account the state of affairs in the republics, is also a matter of the long-term outlook. And the exit to this path lies in the realization of the second point mentioned above-- the economic development of the South Caucasian states.

Fourth, the interest of the "power poles" is necessary for the establishment of the security system of the South Caucasian region. Of course, this interest will be directed toward the achievement of their own aims, and above of all toward the maintenance of economic interests. This issue can be resolved through attracting foreign investments into the region.
This very aspect is one of the main potentials for the future creation of a South Caucasian security system, when both internal and the outside forces are absolutely interested in it.

Integration into various international security systems and organizations

Undoubtedly the participation of the states of the region in various international organizations has a very positive impact on the situation in the region as a whole. Membership in the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and even the CIS has a very beneficial affect on the resolution of internal problems and promotes the democratization of the three republics, which in the future will become a basis for the resolution of the problems existing in their interrelations. Of course, the participation of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia in such structures is at this stage mainly aimed at the quest for arbitrators who might assist in solving certain problems. For the states of the region, the UN, the OSCE, and the CoE serve as some kind of "boxing ring" where the parties come together to settle at least these problems. However, by now it can be asserted that membership in these organizations is becoming a hindrance that keeps the parties from addressing their own differences.

The reverse side of this is that when considering one or another issue related to the region, the above-mentioned organizations often depart from the international standards they themselves have declared. As a result, if this does not aggravate the situation in the region as a whole, it at least impedes positive processes. Additionally, in this case the interests of individual member-states of the international organizations that are included in one or another "power pole" play their own role.

Nevertheless, membership in these structures does in one way or another bring the republics of the South Caucasus toward orientation to unified international-social norms, which subsequently, according to the development of the three republics, is called upon to play its exclusive role in the cause of South Caucasian integration.

Thus, at the present moment it may be asserted that:

  • In the near future, there is no way to establish a common security system and to start integration processes in the South Caucasus. Unfortunately, the region has become a solid knot of contradictions that it will take decades of effort to undo.
  • There exists a danger of protracting the conflicts, as a result of which the republics of the South Caucasus will develop further in diametrically opposed directions. And the day may come when the situation in Azerbaijan and Georgia, including their foreign policy priorities on the one hand, and those of Armenia on the other hand, will so differ from one another that the "borderline" running between the conflicting "power poles" of the world will be clearly drawn in the region of the South Caucasus. And in this case the rapprochement of the two parties, Azerbaijan-Georgia and Armenia will be conditioned by the rapprochement of the "poles" themselves.