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Ibrahim Bayandurlu
Independent political scientist (Azerbaijan) |
Bloody comprehension of truths
Immense areas that once belonged to a nuclear-Bolshevik power are today populated
by nations that through blood and devastation are comprehending and approbating
the universal model of human communal life called democracy or some other name.
After more than seventy years of Bolshevik rule it became completely obvious
that the Leninist-Stalinist political-economic and state-administrative technology
of constructing an inter-national community permitted the containment of inter-national
and inter-ethnic problems only temporarily, and at a tremendous cost. These problems
were resolved within the limits of a unified Soviet Union, and today continue
to shake the vast post-Soviet area of states that have gained full independence.
The Bolsheviks formally accelerated the "statehood creation" of the
nations and nationalities for whom the right to secede was still secured in the
first versions of the Soviet constitution. However, in reality, the Leninist-Stalinist
social experiment tragically kept entire peoples and nations from the path of
development which would have led their consciousness toward healthy natural tolerance
and civilized mutual cooperation.
By the beginning of the Gorbachev reforms the USSR, devoid of a scientific
basis as a social system and as a unique arena for interrelations among ethnic
groups, experienced a deep-laid ideological crisis, which within a period time
developed into a collapse. But as a matter of fact, the motivation for the taking
on by entire nations of the status of subject of the USSR, in order to belong
to a "new historical community of nations - the Soviet people" was shed
more by the communist ideology than by the international, which defined the way
of life and traditions of non-title nations. As Russian sociologist I. Shafarevich
observed, the USSR was a zombie, created by the Bolsheviks out of a "murdered"
Russia by means of communist ideology and dictatorship. Thus, the country of the
Soviets, built on shaky foundations, not reinforced by a productive economic all-Union
organism, simply came crashing down. The debris fell upon the heads of the masses
who, in some sense, went mad, and who, from the end of the 1980s, were inclined
to self-exaltation in the public squares.
The social consciousness of the Soviet peoples simmered in a common soup, in
a standard social economic system that was ruled by the class of party bureaucrats
and party nomenklatura members. In the expanses of the former USSR, this class
remains the ruling force until now. All of this allows us to speak with a great degree of certainty about the comparability
of the inter-ethnic conflicts not only in the South Caucasus but in other regions
of the ex-Evil empire as well.
The similarities among the conflicts in the South Caucasus region are modeled
in principle and the conflicts follow a classic pattern. Let us take as an example
the Tskhinvali syndrome. As is well known, the South Ossetians, who differ in
mentality from the "northerners" (just like the Armenians of Karabakh
differ from their "continental" tribesmen) had the status of an autonomous
oblast (province) within the Georgian SSR. The same status was possessed by the
Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh. One must make the qualification that their status
was the dual realization of the right to self-determination by the same ethnos.
Within the framework of "Leninist national policy" and multistage Soviet
federalism, the Ossetians in the first place became self-realized, attaining the
status of autonomous republic within the RSFSR, and secondly were granted multifunctional
autonomy within Soviet Georgia. The same thing happened to the Armenians. Moreover,
unlike the Ossetians, as a result of their right to self-determination the Armenians
became a full founding member of the USSR, and constituted one of the fifteen
republics of the Union with the constitutionally guaranteed right to secession
and the creation of a state of their own.
Let us continue the comparison. As was true of Nagorno Karabakh, in the era
of the reign of the Communist party, during the seemingly iron stability of the
Soviet Union, Ossetian-Georgian relations were by no means idyllic. Periodically,
in scientific and intellectual circles, primarily pseudo-scientific disputes would
flare up around the question of which nation in the territory was more aboriginal
than the other. My point has nothing to do with who was right. I tend to believe
that developing ethno-political aspirations on the basis of historical aboriginality
is an anachronism. I am convinced that the inferiority complex about someone's
perception of your nation as non-native in the given territory, and all the more,
the irresistible urge to refute round the clock this very non-nativeness, is,
if you will forgive me, ethno- pathology. After all, the Baltic nations are not
aboriginal on the territories of their states. What of it? They don't gnaw at
each other's throats or anyone else's.
During the perestroika period, unrest of a social nature at first began in
the capitals of the regional autonomies. However, very soon in the central square
of Tskhinvali, as well as that of Stepanakert, mass rallies demanding the "reunification
with the historical motherland" were taking place. In both places the new
Gorbachev-appointed leaders of the autonomies who had replaced the Brezhnev-era
provincial party bosses not only did not stop their tribesmen but also diverted
those processes into a fundamentally different course. After the replacement of
the leadership in both autonomous regions, local Soviet (legislative) bodies of
the regions adopted anti-constitutional decisions on secession from Georgia and
Azerbaijan. The reactions of Tbilisi and Baku were absolutely identical.
It is not out of place to cite Shafarevich once again. He finds that "the
forces in the RSFSR that were fighting for power with the leadership of the USSR
used as a weapon the separatist movements in other republics. As we know, the
success here was complete."
We have all the grounds to assume that in both of these conflicts, at first
invisibly, and thereafter more apparently and institutionally, the factor of a
third force was present. This was in the beginning in the shape of Gorbachev's
center and the Russian democrats who legitimately laid hands on the institutions
of high authority, and subsequently, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in
the shape of Yeltsin's Russia, which manipulated the entire "conflictological
arsenal" in order to assert their geopolitical interests in the region.
Thus, the functional and original similarity of all the conflicts in the South
Caucasus is absolutely obvious. The Georgian - Abkhazian collision doesn't constitute
an exception either. Today this conflict is on the front line of the Russian -American
great geopolitical war, which however, after September 11 was transformed into
nice, amicable disputes over turf. These quiet disputes are now growing into loud
adjustments of roles and limits of influence.
If we distance ourselves from strictly scientific definitions, then undoubtedly
the objects of the Georgian - Abkhazian conflict are the Georgian and the Abkhazian
nations as well as their great and blessed land. And the subjects are the political
economic elites of these nations, certain segments of the Russian elite, plus
western politicians.
Contrary to various kinds of pseudo-scientific evidence, the Georgians and
the Abkhazians are the bearers of the same subculture. Most probably because of
this, these two nations are clarifying their relations. Both have an identical,
possibly consanguineous arrogance which is, however, by virtue of genetic good
manners, possible to overcome in the name of peace. But very unfortunately, the
subjects of the conflict are the elites whose interests are often hard to understand,
let alone formulate. This applies most of all to the Abkhazian elite. As a significant
subject of the conflict, the Abkhazian elite is apparently capable of understanding
that the Gamsakhurdian ultra-nationalistic injection into the national self-consciousness
of the Georgians caused it incurable paralysis (fortunately). This self-consciousness
had given rise to the illusion that it was possible to settle the conflict by
means of ethnic cleansing and the abolishment of the Abkhazian autonomous entity.
But as Georgian society was unwilling to lose Abkhazia once and for all, this
absolutely matured into the full-fledged, functional and democratic federalization
of Georgia. This is a big misfortune of the Abkhazian elite, inasmuch as the quite
tangible prospect of Georgian membership the European Union "threatens"
Abkhazia as a subject of the federative Georgia with much more attractive choices
than the blind observance of Russian geopolitical commandments. Ultimately, becoming
part of Europe will provide Abkhazia with the opportunity for spiritual self-affirmation
and self-realization. It is clear as day that Georgia will become a member of
the EU far sooner than Russia will. And then the Europeans will consider the non-
integrity of Georgia as their own.
The other subject of the conflict is the Georgian political elite. As we noted
earlier, the lesson of ex-president Gamsakhurdia did not pass without leaving
a trace. Political and governmental circles in Georgia are disposed to a peaceful
outcome of the collision.
One of the vector-forming subjects in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is Russia
in the shape of the orthodox-minded part of the high-powered political elite and
the high military command, as well as the financial oligarchic circles, which
profess imperial values. Undoubtedly, for the fate of the Caucasian nations, and
Caucasian democracy, if you will, all three components of Russia's being a subject
in this conflict are extremely destructive. These forces sometimes resort to the
tactics of actively aggressive opposition to the penetration of the US and its
allies to the boundaries of Russia, and sometimes (after September 11) make a
collusive agreement with the same Americans in order to get carte blanche for
accomplishing certain military tasks. Through this they impede the formation of
an integral, spiritually self-sufficient, and, at the same time, realizable all-Russian,
democratic, and national doctrine of development. In such circumstances some South
Caucasian nations not only deprive themselves of the opportunity of progressive
movement towards European standards, but also, through their separatism overburden
Georgia and Azerbaijan on their road to the European family of nations. Here it
will be much to the point to again quote Shafarevich, who in continuation of his
thoughts on the utilization of the separatist movements in the republics of the
former Soviet Union by Russian political circles fairly observed: "But it
was naïve to hope that such a process would stop at the boundaries of the RSFSR.
And it went farther, deep inside: more and more territories are declaring their
sovereignty, upgrading their status". It is worth adding to his observation
that Russian federalism, which has from the moment of the self-destruction of
the USSR pretended to a status of democratic federative statehood, is going through
a phase of "multi-stage Chechenization". No one knows what the end of
all of this may be.
A natural question arises - is it possible that the nations of the South Caucasus
do not understand the essence of what is going on, is it possible that nations
which have deep cultural and spiritual roots do not want peace? Or is it that
they have no influence over their leaders, and all decisions are being made for
them.
It is easiest to say that the nations have no say and everything takes place
at the will of the world geopolitical centers, and that this will is put into
effect with the assistance of the depraved national elites. It must be admitted
that there is a considerable proportion of truth here. It is exactly the superpower,
the ex-superpower and the Europeans with their nuclear arsenals who by crossing
their geopolitical swords produce a hand of military-strategic and geo-economic
cards. These cards determine the behavior pattern of the national elites who thrust
upon on their nations war-mongering slogans. And, vice versa, when the superpowers
need it, the elites preach peace, which although it exists, is fragile.
But on closer examination of the issue, it turns out that not everything is
so simple. In the on-going processes the role of the nations themselves is inexorable.
A great deal also occurs because such is the psychological mood of the nations.
The South Caucasus is a land of spiritual, and at the same time functional, elder
worship. And the elders by virtue of their age can distinguish universal wisdom
from demagogy. But I have great suspicions that the elders too are ambitious,
and thus, that the nations spiritually guided by them are ambitious.
It would be logical to assume that public opinion in the countries of the South
Caucasus is extremely non-constructive. It is very fitting to conclude with a
reflection of the Scottish philosopher David Hume: "The struggle for freedom
in the final analysis is not the resistance against despots and oligarchs, but
the resistance against the despotism of public opinion".
