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Kakha Katsitadze
Doctor of Philosophy, Professor (Georgia) |
Geopolitical pluralism and the future of the South Caucasus
The South Caucasus has had a strange fate. Over the last several centuries
its unification into a single whole has by no means been achieved. Possibly, this
is because of its mountainous relief. Mountains do not unite, they divide. However,
it would be incorrect to write off the problems of the South Caucasus to natural
conditions. The primary causes are xenophobia, hatred, and the incapacity to listen
to and understand each other.
The more the geopolitical significance of the entire Caucasus increases, the
more parties there are who wish to turn the ongoing processes here to their own
advantage. In this connection, it is not at all necessary that the desired scenario
correspond to the interests of the Caucasian states themselves. This above all
applies to the Northern neighbor, Russia. Russia should not be demonized, but
its Caucasian policy, if it exists at all, does not stand up to criticism. Lately
the motives behind Russia's attitude toward the South Caucasian countries, and
toward Georgia in particular, have been much discussed. A great number of factors
have an impact on Russian policy, beginning with the ambitions of its imperial
past and ending with the internal political alignment of forces, and the impact
of the military on foreign policy. As a rule, the great majority of the Russian
population wishes not for economic prosperity and to live in dignity, but for
the world be afraid of Russia (we are talking precisely about fear here, not respect).
Mainly because of its internal political situation, Russia needs to follow
a course that justifies its imperial ambitions. This course must be reinforced
by an ideology (it is unimportant whether this is enunciated or not). In order
for such an ideology to become national, it must contain principles which satisfy
all Derzhavniks (devotees of super-power status) beginning with Communist-Bolsheviks
and ending with monarchists. A unique, curious embodiment of this union could
be seen at the rallies of the Derzhavniks, where the participants held up portraits
of Tsar Nicholas II and his murderer Vladimir Lenin at the same time. The strange
pairing of the Tsar's double-headed eagle and the Soviet national anthem is another
manifestation of this uniqueness. Obviously, Marxism-Leninism can no longer be
a uniting factor. It has been so discredited that it is unacceptable even for
the majority of Derzhavniks. The new ideology is increasingly oriented toward
geopolitical factors and based on the principle of geopolitical pluralism or a
multi-polar world.
Paradoxically, this doctrine, like Marxism, is imported to Russia from the
West. However, as was the case with European Marxism (which categorically denied
the possibility of a socialist revolution in Russia), Russian ideologists endowed
geopolitical pluralism with a completely different content, making it divergent
from the original.
If I am not mistaken, the term "geopolitical pluralism" was first
used by Zbignew Brzezinski. He implies a situation in which the post-Soviet space
is not divided into spheres of influence, but constitutes an object of free competition.
And each subject occupies a place suited to its potential.
Apparently, the principle of free competition does not suit Russia much, as
it cannot, by virtue of resources or other parameters, occupy a more or less significant
place in this area. Precisely because of this, Russian ideologists endow the concept
of geopolitical pluralism with a completely different content. According to their
interpretation, pluralism is the existence of several geopolitical centers in
the world. Considered equally with the West are Russia, China, India, and even
Iran. The "multi-polar" world eventually will transform into the bi-polar.
On the one side is the West, on the other the states mentioned above, led, of
course, by Russia. Geopolitical pluralism according to Russia has another feature
of no small importance: these poles should possess their own spheres of influence.
Everyone can do whatever they see fit in any given territory. Russia has been
demanding the CIS and to a certain degree the Balkans for itself, while generously
ceding Latin America and Africa to the West.
Apparently, those who plan Russian policy know that the country cannot endlessly
receive assistance from the West, maintain its own influence, and contribute to
the fomentation of conflicts. The Georgian-Abkhazian, the Armenian-Azerbaijani,
and the Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, the civil war in Georgia - here is an incomplete
list of the conflicts provoked. It is clear that in no circumstances should one
ignore the responsibility of those forces that have involuntarily or consciously
played the role of Russian agents.
All disputes may have material and spiritual causes. A conflict that emerges
on a material base is the inability of the parties to divide their resources in
a way that everybody is satisfied. For the most part conflicts emerge because
of valuable resources. As for the spiritual causes of conflicts, they can be more
diverse. For example they can be a hypertrophied suspicious perception of one
another, mental stereotypes about the monstrosity of the rival party, historical
resentments, various phobias, conviction that the partner is at a "lower"
level of development, constant confidence in ones own righteousness, and conversely,
in the culpability of the opposite side, etc. In conflicts between small states,
spiritual causes predominate.
When examining the Caucasian conflicts one can clearly sense the spiritual
and material causes of their origin, but in the escalation, nevertheless, mental
stereotypes and phobias play a big part. Another distinctive feature of conflict
development in the South Caucasus is the standard scenario of Russian involvement.
At a certain stage, Russian peacemaking troops have been introduced into almost
all conflict zones. They stay there for an indefinite period of time; moreover
the conflicts are not resolved at all, but are preserved for an indefinite period
of time.
I strongly doubt that this scenario is of any benefit to Russia. However, this
does not disturb the Moscow rulers much. The main thing for them is to bar Western
influence in the region, and to hinder the investment of capital into the territory
that they consider their own patrimony.
However, international relations are not determined by one's wishes alone.
Of no less importance are objective parameters. According to these parameters,
the breach between the West and Russia has become increasingly significant, and
this has an impact on the character of international relations, including those
in the Caucasus.
By the end of 2002, the process of the integration of the Balkan and the Baltic
states into NATO will be completed, and Turkey will make real steps along the
path of accession to the European Union. As result, the Caucasus will directly
border upon the West. Only a few years ago, from the point of view of analysts,
the Caucasus was not even on the outskirts of Europe (the Balkans were considered
as such). Today, when a plan similar to the Marshall plan has been elaborated
for the integration of the Balkans into Europe, the Caucasus is at least acquiring
the status of the outskirts of Europe. Whether the Caucasus will achieve more
depends on the politicians of the region.
The transformation of the Caucasus into the outskirts of Europe coincides with
the structurization there of a world system of energy resources which will considerably
change the character of the world energy order, and in the final analysis, the
world order in general. In the South Caucasus, knots of geopolitical, geostrategic,
and geoeconomic development are being formed, which in turn is having an impact
on the system of international relations. In addition, the West already possesses
sufficient resources to suppress the resumption of conflicts in the South Caucasus
(although, so far it does not have sufficient power to settle already existing
conflicts).
One should not idealize the West and explain its Caucasian policy through altruism.
The West is interested in peace and security in the Caucasus for its own reasons.
The Caucasian conflicts are fraught with the great danger of displacement of large
masses of refugees, including to the Western countries. Besides, a multitude of
systems of international communications that will connect the rich Northern European
states with Central Asia and the states of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean
regions can pass through a stable Caucasus. These projects will not cause any
real damage to Russia, but the benefits derived from them will be tangible. We
are talking about material profit from participation in these projects, and about
the opportunity to improve the welfare of the Russian people. However, for some
reason, Russia perceives the implementation of these communication projects as
a challenge, and based upon its own interpretations of the doctrine of geopolitical
pluralism and the multi-polarity of the world, insists on forever enlisting the
Caucasus into its sphere of influence.
If we compare the existing situation with the situation in 1918-1921, we will
see a striking similarity. Then too, the Baltic states managed to avoid conflicts
with each other, owing to which they were able to retain their independence for
another 20 years. After the collapse of the USSR this experience permited them
to build Westen-type states in a very brief space of time. Unlike the Baltic nations,
the nations of the South Caucasus, both at that time and after the collapse of
the USSR, got involved in conflicts, which were exploited by Russia.
How this can be explained?
For the Armenians, the conflict with the Azerbaijanis is their own problem
alone, and they probably do not reflect on the fact that this conflict is a problem
for the other party as well. The same may be said about the Azerbaijanis, the
Georgians, the Abkhazians, the Ossetians, etc. This fact is a consequence of the
complete estrangement of "oneself" from the opposite side, when "we"
are perceived as the bearers of the absolute positive value, and "they"
as the bearers of the absolute negative.
In spite of all this, one can make an optimistic prediction for the future
of the South Caucasian region. Becouse ten years ago nobody could even imagine
such a vivid interest of the West in the Caucasus, and such a clear attitude toward
the Caucasian policy of Russia.
Summarizing the above we can draw two main conclusions:
- Integration processes in the South Caucasus are hindered by the international
background, along with other factors. In particular, in each case the actions
of Russia have a different motivation.
- The Caucasus is gradually becoming a zone of intersection of very substantial
international, political and economic interests. Because of this the West is attempting
to put pressure upon Russia, in order that it play a positive role in Caucasian
processses, and in the settlement of conflicts. It is a different question how
successful these attempts will be. After all, there are forces in the South Caucasus
who have bet on Russia. It will be hard for them to exit the sphere of Russian
influence.
