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Mamuka Bichashvili
Doctor of Philosophy; Professor, Tbilisi State University (Georgia) |
Regionalism in the Foreign Policy of the South Caucasian States
There are, or course, many examples of when one country of the South Caucasian
region or another has taken initiatives in support of its neighbors. For example,
Georgia, which was first among the Caucasian states to be admitted to the European
Parliament, later recommended that Armenia and Azerbaijan be admitted to the organization;
Armenia has made proposals on the peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Azerbaijani
conflict, etc. However, in our opinion, regionalism in the foreign political relations
of the Caucasian states implies something else --namely, the extent to which these
countries conduct themselves as if they represent a single region - the Caucasus.
Today the countries of the Caucasus lack a community of interest and political
guideposts; as a result they defend their interests in the international arena
separately. There are reasons for this: the burden of history (long-unsettled
relations between Armenia and Turkey, the 19th century Caucasian war engraved
on the memory of the Chechens), and the development of events since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Finally, it is necessary to emphasize the geopolitical orientation
of the South Caucasian states, in which their alienation becomes most strikingly
apparent. Let us examine this aspect in detail.
Russia has a great influence upon the Caucasus, and apprehensive of various
threats from the South, it attempts to consolidate its grip on the region by all
available means. The course of events in the Caucasus is also influenced by the
enlargement of NATO and Europe, though the latter does not, in principle, have
specific strategic plans and is satisfied with purely economic considerations.
The South Caucasian states take part in various European structures and this,
from our point of view, has been made possible because Europe itself is included
in global processes.
It is no secret that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, two political
alliances - one vertical and one horizontal - have formed in the Caucasus. On
the one hand Armenia has become close to Russia and Iran, on the other hand Georgia
has attempted to find its place in the traditional Azerbaijani-Turkish alliance,
while taking Russian interests into account at the same time.
Russia has significantly helped Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan, and
has received quite a lot in exchange: it has become firmly settled in the region
through close military and economic ties with Armenia. The current Armenian leadership,
which rose to power on the wave of the Karabakh conflict, sees a natural ally
in Russia, with the help of which it can restrain Azerbaijani-Turkish pressure.
For a full-scale union with Russia, Armenia needs reliable strategic communications.
During his visit to Georgia in the fall of 2002, the speaker of the parliament
of Armenia touched upon the question of the restoration of railway communication
through Abkhazia in his conversations in official Georgian circles. Interestingly,
this idea coincides with the plan of the unruly leader of Adjaria, Aslan Abashidze,
who raises as a precondition to the restoration of Georgian-Abkhazian relations
the question of unblocking the Abkhazian railways.
Georgia depends on Russia to a no lesser degree. We have in mind not only the
three Russian military bases stationed on the territory of Georgia, and the Georgian
regions with so called "frozen ethnic conflicts" (Russia has secured
its military presence there in the guise of peace-keeping forces), but also Georgia's
economic and, above all, energy dependence on Russia. Russia skillfully manipulates
this lever of pressure and when necessary makes the Georgian leadership more compliant.
Georgia is particularly alarmed by the Chechen war and the spread of terrorism.
Both have assumed a large scale and have threatened to expand onto Georgian territory.
In addition, unlike in Azerbaijan, which unequivocally orients itself to Turkey,
in Georgia some kind of a condominium between the US and Russia is taking shape.
The fact is that the United States is another power that has certain interests
in the Caucasus, and sometimes directly, sometimes times with the help of its
NATO ally Turkey, is systematically penetrating the South Caucasian region. The
Georgian leadership has to take American interests into consideration as well,
especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 when the US declared
the beginning of its global war against terrorism. Russia, which has had its own
dealings with terrorism, nominally (and in Afghanistan, substantively) supports
the US counter-terrorist efforts and greets the arrival of the Americans in the
South Caucasus quite enthusiastically. Besides its military-strategic interests
in our region, the US is also interested in energy matters. In spite of the fact
that the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea is not particularly rich in energy
resources, the American side, through Western oil companies, has no objection
to laying its hands on it. Russia, through its Lukoil oil company, is participating
in the implementation of the Baku-Ceyhan project, but apparently, is not satisfied
with its share.
This brief review of the geopolitical interests of the main powers concerned
with the Caucasus is evidence that the states of the region are strictly limited
in their capacity to act independently, and that they are compelled to take these
interests into account. Despite all of this, it is possible to distinguish several
directions that would contribute to the consolidation of the regional security
system in the Caucasus.
Potentials for the creation of security systems in the South Caucasus
Of all political problems, it is clearly conflicts that first demand our attention.
The wave of conflicts in the South Caucasus has abated today, but the conflicts
have not been resolved, only preserved by the forces that in their time kindled
the fires of war. In reality, the conflicts in the Caucasus have continued to
this day. It is no secret that the military operations of the Russian troops in
Chechnya have seriously aggravated the situation in the North Caucasus and the
adjacent territories. Georgia, more than the other two South Caucasian states,
senses all the danger in the situation that exists in the entire Caucasus. The
recurrent crisis in Russian-Georgian relations and President Putin of Russia's
unprecedented statement of September 11, 2002 testify to this.
Of course, the real situation in the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia is nothing like
the picture presented in the Russian mass media. In fact, there are not and never
have been military bases, vacation homes or training camps of Chechen resistance
forces in the gorge. It is by no means true that every terrorist of "Chechen
origin" received combat training in this small corner of Georgia before committing
a terrorist act. But at the same time it must be acknowledged that the Georgian
leadership has undoubtedly been guilty of connivance and indecision in dealing
with the criminals and guerillas dug into the Pankisi Gorge, whose presence in
the territory of Georgia has for long time been completely denied. The Russian
leaders had indeed proposed a joint operation against the Chechens at the appropriate
time. However, Georgia saw in this proposal the danger of extending the conflict
into its territory and of being drawn into the conflict itself, with all the consequences.
This and the tragic events of October 2002 in Moscow, when more than 700 innocent
people found themselves held hostage by terrorists, confirm that after so many
ordeals a strong "party of war" still exists on the post Soviet territory.
It appears that for the political resolution of the problems accumulated in the
South Caucasus, a summit meeting must be convened in which all interested parties
can participate along with the states of the region. Such a meeting should be
considered as only the beginning of an all-Caucasian dialogue that must conclude
with the adoption of a document containing the solutions to the most important
political problems of the region. It must openly address all the accumulated problems,
without unnecessary curtseys, and seek solutions, beginning with the issues that
give rise to the minimum controversy.
The pledge for success within the political dialogue of the states of the Trans-Caucasus
could be the regional balance of military power. Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan
have long ago acceded to a mutual framework treaty defining the balance of military
forces for each South Caucasian country --the Paris Agreement on quotas for conventional
armaments in the Caucasus. Every state that accedes to it is obligated to have
on its territory no more than 220 tanks, the same number of armored troop-carriers
or armored infantry cars, 280 100-millimeter artillery systems, 100 attack aircraft
and 50 attack helicopters. Though this agreement takes quantitative rather than
qualitative parameters of armament into account, and does not weigh the presence
of various peacekeeping forces with their own munitions, it may undoubtedly play
a positive role.
In spite of this balanced initial position, the activation of military preparations
can be observed in the South Caucasian states. For example, "the Caucasus",
an American-Turkish group of specialists dealing with issues of military planning,
recently visited Azerbaijan (and later Central Asia). Baku hoped that this visit
would help Azerbaijan to play a key role in the implementation of US military
policy in the southern post-Soviet territory. As if in response to this American
visit, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force, Colonel-General Vladimir
Mikhailov, visited Armenia. The aim of his visit was to discuss with the Armenian
side issues of military and military-technical cooperation within the framework
of the joint anti-aircraft defense system of the CIS. Meanwhile, since May 2002,
American instructors have been engaged in training special assignment units in
Georgia. Undoubtedly, each state of the region has the right to choose the partner
that seems to suit them best at the moment. But it should not be forgotten that
the big states play their big politics whereas we - the Caucasians-- worry first
of all about our regional issues.
The next important subject affecting the interests of all the South Caucasian
states is the economy. Among the economic projects put forward for the Caucasus
so far, so-called transit projects predominate. The EU TRACECA project, which
foresees the establishment of a common transportation and communication zone,
may have great significance for South Caucasian integration and even for the North
Caucasus. In addition, cooperation in the fields of gas, oil and trade will bring
profit to local and federal budgets. In an economically strong region the threat
of social conflicts will undoubtedly decrease and thus the ground for instability
caused by unemployment, poverty and unsettled populations will be eliminated.
It is very important that this project implies the cooperation of the South Caucasian
states with neighboring Northern regions, including the Stavropol and Krasnodar
regions. The inclusion of these subjects of the Russian Federation into integration
processes can contribute to Russia's overcoming its mistrust and reconsidering
its tough customs policy, which hinders the circulation of goods in the region.
A paradoxical situation can be observed today: the Western states have designated
their economic interests in the region, but Russia is moving away from the Caucasus
economically. Of course, on one hand the conflicts in Abkhazia, Chechnya and Daghestan
have contributed to this, but on the other hand Russia itself does not show a
particular interest in economic integration with the countries of the South Caucasus.
In this situation the idea of looking for alternative economic partners is gaining
more and more support. In addition, long-standing economic links with the regions
of Russia are not being considered. It is necessary to restore these links.
A separate matter is the role of the South Caucasus in the economic cooperation
of the states of the Black Sea basin. This will allow these states to gradually
integrate into the world market, and step-by-step, to become accustomed to its
standards and requirements. This integration seems both more attractive and quite
difficult to realize. The establishment of the Caucasian common market will possibly
be the first step on the path to the integration of the region itself, and later
on other countries may be engaged.
It should be taken into account that the prevalence of economic over political
interests will radically alter the image of the South Caucasian region and will
promote large-scale investment.
Where does the integration of states into various international organizations
lead?
The benefits of the integration of South Caucasian states into various international
organizations are substantial. First of all, the existing conflicts in the Caucasus
have become internationalized, and the parties have passed from the language of
weapons to the language of diplomacy.
All countries of the region are CIS member-states. Despite different interpretations
of the usefulness of this organization, we consider that the CIS has played a
positive role in the processes taking place since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Complicated political problems have been solved through negotiations within the
framework of the CIS. And although we are not satisfied with the present degree
of economic cooperation among the member-states of the CIS, we must admit that
the existing relations have been maintained only thanks to the permanent contacts
of heads of state within the framework of this organization.
Of no less importance are the multilateral relations of the states of the region
within the framework of the GUUAM alliance. The Trans-Caucasian states are also
members of such political organizations as the UN, the OSCE, etc. Participation
in these forums provides the states of the Caucasian region with the opportunity
to adjust and conduct their policy according to international standards. It is
important to bear in mind that there exist a number of common issues (globalization,
international terrorism, women's movements, etc), which, if they are not yet of
urgency for the region today, may come knocking at the door tomorrow. The integration
processes in the world as a whole are conditioned by the desire of the nations
to jointly overcome common hardships, and it appears that the Caucasians will
share the same fate in the final analysis.
