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Nugzar Gogorishvili
Conflict resolution specialist, retired lieutenant colonel (Georgia) |
Conflicts in the South Caucasus: Who, How, and What For?
Links in a chain
When examining the conflicts in the South Caucasus, it is best to proceed
from the idea that they are links in a chain.
There is no universal definition of the concept of conflict. In our case,
a conflict is a situation within a state and around it (within the region) that
endangers the priorities of the state.
The characteristics of the conflicts in the South Caucasus are:
- the multidimensionality of factors in each conflict
- the number of sides involved in the conflict
- the number of sides with geopolitical and economic interest in the region
- the new geo-economic space created on the base of these factors, and the number
of sides united within a given dimension.
When we compare the conflicts in the South Caucasus of the last 15 years, we
can affirm that each of them:
- resulted from the deep politico-economic and socio-psychological crisis the
USSR was in from the late 1970's;
- began with a declaration of "the right of a nation to self-determination"
and later on became a demand for the transfer of land from one legal entity to
another;
- contributed to the transfer of the irreversible effects of the politico-economic
and socio-psychological crisis from the political center of the USSR to the periphery
of the state.
Western observers distinguish two main directions in the "Southern Policy"
of outside players: the geo-political, or military-political influence, and the
"pragmatic", or economic influence on the region. For the "oilmen",
Azerbaijan is the center of interest; for the geo-politicians, Georgia. Yet on
the subject of Russia, "…there is no talk of a dichotomy; in the conflict
around resources, around the extraction and transportation of energy raw materials,
forceful political accents mix with pragmatic-economic ones" [1].
The main element in a background that fosters conflict, and one equally vigorously
pointed to by all parties, is history.
In terms of epochs, the South Caucasus was a mighty, economically developed,
inter-state entity for only a short period of time. For considerably longer, the
region was disconnected and divided into many princedoms, kingdoms and khanates,
constantly warring among themselves. And as often happens in such situations,
it became quite vulnerable to anyone who wanted to take hold of it. Thus, to facilitate
the task of conquering the region, it is not necessary to intensify historically
existing contradictions, but only to maintain them. The picture in question can
be was observed throughout the region's two-hundred-year existence within the
Russian Empire, which was transformed into the USSR in the 20th century.
Factors that influence the processes occurring in the region and are utilized
as a tool for escalation of a crisis or a conflict are:
- the multi-ethnicity of the region (the ethnic factor)
- the diversity of religious denominations (the confessional factor)
- the diversity of culture, traditions and mentality of various strata of society
within each state and the region as a whole (the social, cultural and psychological
factors)
- the diverse degrees of economic development and interdependency of the subjects
of the South Caucasus (the economic factor)
- the as yet unestablished unstated concepts of domestic and foreign policy
(the unformed state factor)
All factors enumerated above are manifested in different ways and in each particular
case, and, correspondingly, have different consequences. But it is also necessary
to create favorable conditions for their development. These conditions are mostly
influenced by the internal political situation in Russia.
"In foreign policy alone, with respect to the Transcaucasian states from
1997 to 1999, Elizabeth Fuller discovered "no less than eight separate Russian
players (the president's administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Ministry of Defense, other government agencies, the State Duma, the energy lobby,
the Executive Secretary of the CIS - B. Berezovsky, and the Federal Department
of Border Guards)" [2]. These groups execute
their mission in the de-facto and de-jure subject lands of the South Caucasus
through the regional and state elites, the representatives of legislative and
executive power, that occupy not secondary positions in corresponding structures.
Moreover, it is mainly the former Soviet administrative and party nomenklatura
that is in power in the region.
What was happening, then, during those years (1997-1999) in the South Caucasus?
A step-by-step monopolization of oil, gas and electrical industry began throughout
the region. In order to achieve this objective in the energy sector, a favorable
political background throughout the region, i.e. in all three South Caucasian
states, was necessary.
1998 -the forced resignation of the democratically-elected first President
of Armenia, a terrorist attack against the President of Georgia, the instigated
escalation of the conflict in the Gali region of Abkhazia following the replacement
of the minister of defense of Georgia, as a result of which Tbilisi lost practical
control over the region, the October rebellion of the supporters of ex-president
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, tantamount to a civil war in Georgia (again instigated by
certain internal structures controlled by corresponding structures in Russia).
1999 - the formation in Armenia of a serious political force (the Unity Block)
and fear in Russia of completely losing control over the region, the provocation
in April of an armed border clash between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces,
which occurred place near the Georgian border. This was unsuccessful as the detachments
of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia, and even more, the Georgian, avoided involvement,
which would have been tantamount to the beginning of a Caucasian war.
The 1999 parliamentary elections in Armenia, in which constructive pro-Armenian
forces won, causing alarm among advocates of escalation. On October 27, 1999 the
true political and popular of the country was assassinated.
It should be noted that the events of May 1998 and October 2001 in the zone
of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict pursued an important objective - to drag the
detachments of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia into a military incident, which
would mean the conversion of the conflict into another political dimension - war.
The Pankisi gorge factor
In 1998 the shadow economy began to flourish (especially in Georgia). Corruption,
criminal activity (connected to bandit attacks on the citizens of European states,
kidnapping people for ransom), and drug trafficking reached an unprecedented scale.
The Pankisi gorge factor began to take shape.
The most important element for the settlement processes, as well as for the
creation (or aggravation) of the crisis and/or conflict itself, is an appropriate
information background. The Pankisi gorge factor is a classic example of such
an information background, which was thoroughly created over last four years by
outside players utilizing the various internal structures and systems under their
control.
In the fall of 1998 a program was broadcast on Russian TV about conferring
military decorations to the family members of the servicemen killed in Chechnya
during military operations... After the ceremony, then-President of the Russian
Federation Boris Yeltsin, in the presence of his power ministers, made a promise
to the Russian people to expel the Chechen guerilla warriors beyond the bounds
of Russia. But the question arises - where to?
It was just then in 1998 that the mass settlement of the Pankisi gorge by
the refugees from the zone of military operations in Chechnya began. The Pankisi
gorge factor may be compared to poker game with several wild cards.
1. In all international structures (UN, OSCE, EU) it is legally fixed that
conflicts in Georgia are instigated and directed by outside players (are imported).
Meanwhile, from the very outset the Pankisi gorge factor contributed to creating
a background featuring the export of the conflict from Georgia to the Russian
Federation. And, consequently the "revelation" of the Chechens in Georgia
provides the opportunity, if necessary, to announce the existence of a terrorist
nest in Georgia, which represents a threat to a neighboring country - Russia.
2. The inflammation of the situation in Chechnya (kidnapping, plunder, the
expansion of drug dealing) and linkage of everything to the Pankisi gorge, where
the refugees from Chechnya reside locally. (This criminal activity was well known
to international organizations during the military operations in Chechnya.)
3. The utilization of a number of armed groups consisting of people of Chechen
origin and controlled by the Russian special services (whose passage into Georgia
was carried out by these services) and the conducting of more carefully planned
provocations in the conflict zones of Georgia (such as the May 1998 events in
the Gali region of Abkhazia). One such operation was conducted in the fall of
2001 and needs to be thoroughly investigated by the appropriate structures.
4. When demanding to conduct an anti-criminal (after September 11,2001 - anti-terrorist)
operation on the territory of the Pankisi gorge with its special services, the
Russian government was taking into consideration the historical experience of
the 19th century, when the Russian Empire succeded in suppressing the national
struggle for liberation of the Chechen people. The only difference is at that
time it was accomplished by forces under the command of the Georgian General Orbeliani.
This fact determined for a long period of time the less than favorable attitude
of the Chechens (and other mountainous people of the Caucasus) towards the Georgian
people. It was also one of the main causes of the participation of Chechen armed
detachments against the Georgians in the military operations of 1992-1993.
5. There is a constant hotbed of criminal activity along the main route of
the oil and gas main pipelines, in immediate proximity, moreover, to the Russian
border, which includes people who fled Russian justice in Chechnya. This provides
the opportunity for the presence of Russian special forces on the territory of
Georgia, in the interests of the international community.
6. If and when the power structure in Georgia is replaced with people convenient
for the Russian political establishment, and measures are taken to eradicate the
set of destabilizing factors in the Pankisi Gorge, the armed Chechens will leave
the gorge. Naturally, they will go to their places of origin in Chechnya, which
is legally subject to the Russian Federation.
When this happens, the information machinery will spring into action, stating
that Chechen terrorists are heading towards Russian from Georgia, Georgia will
be put into a class with Afghanistan, and the cyclical introduction of Russian
armed forces into the country will be legalized, in accordance with the international
war on terror.
In this context, we observe a different situation in the Georgian/Ossetian
conflict zone.
To block Georgia and the rest of the South Caucasus from the Tskhinvali zone
(analogously to the Abkhazian) does not fall within the sphere of interests of
the outside (northern) player for a number of reasons. The main things this would
mean are:
- Depriving itself of opportunities for economic sabotage against Georgia;
- Cutting off the entire South Caucasian region, and in particular its strategic
partner, Armenia. Such an action by Russia might contribute to an improvement
in Armenian-Turkish relations, which would be favorable to the resolution of the
Kharabakh conflict.
If events developed this way, Russia would be obliged either to completely
reject its plans related to the energy sources in the Caspian basin, or to initiate
open aggression in the region.
Who will settle the conflicts
The heads of state, entire state machinery (of all interested sides) and international
mediating organizations are at the top of a political pyramid. They should embody
the vector that is created under the influence of the people. The people (horizontal
relations) of the sides are at the base of all political relations.
Therefore, the best way to create instability in the region is to promote the
maximum division among the people within each state, if possible into several
irreconcilable groupings in a constant state of ferment. If the same process is
provoked in the circle of political parties (which have authority among the people),
this will serve to deepen the divisions among the people, who are the foundation
of any state entity.
In these processes, the socio-psychological factor is dominant, as members
of the public support not a certain (strategic) direction of development, but
people close to them (friends and relatives). This is especially important to
take into account when analyzing the processes in the South Caucasus. In our reality,
all these processes are managed by the high-level functionaries of the state apparatus,
which means that the governments themselves do not contribute to forming the states.
For the real integration of society, the government must focus on the task
of increasing individual prosperity, and following prosperity, on security, as
the basis and guarantee of the main human rights- the right to life, to peaceful
coexistence and work.
An officer in the Kharabakh Ministry of Defense said to me in conversation
what is, to my mind, a wise thing: "We have a strong army, staffed with excellent
young men. Azerbaijan has an army no less strong. If military activity between
us is resumed, one side may win the battle. But who will win the war?"
De-escalation always follows a pattern. This resembles a continuation in the
time dimension of the processes, but in a downward curve (see the diagram below).
If the order of these processes is violated, we witness an inverse reaction
and escalation of the conflict (crisis), which contributes to the de facto maintenance
of the status quo, but in forms more complicated, and hence more complicated to
resolve in further attempts. Escalation is often accompanied by new victims among
the people, deepening the factor of estrangement of the opposing sides.
In our case, in which the status quo has been maintained for nearly ten years,
the generation which will lead the politics of its country twenty years from now
has been raised on this factor of estrangement. This the most difficult after-effect
in a region as poly-ethnic and poly-confessional as the South Caucasus.
If we make diagrams of main and intersecting events in all the conflict zones
in the South Caucasus, we get a good general picture of the events taking place
in the region:
- the Kharabakh conflict and the dynamics in the conflict zone;
- the dynamics of the interrelations between the subjects of the Kharabakh (Azerbaijan-Kharabakh,
Azerbaijan-Armenia, Armenia-Kharabakh, South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts;
- the dynamics of the military operation in Chechnya;
- the dynamics of domestic and foreign policy events in Russia and the South
Caucasian states;
- the dynamics of crime in the conflict zones (kidnapping, drug-trafficking,
etc.);
Conducting such research is important today, in view of the fact that at no
time since the Caribbean crisis of 1962 have we been so close to a third world
war.
(example: the development of the conflict in Abkhazia (Georgia)
since 1978)
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1. Ethno-political crisis; 2. Conflict; 3. Confrontation; 4. Armed clash;
5. Armed conflict
_ _ _ _ _ possible transformation of the conflict in case of favorable conditions.
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[1] Foreign policy of Russia: from Yeltsin to
Putin. Stefan Kreutzenberger, Sabine Grabovsky, Utta Unzer. P. 159.
[2] Foreign policy of Russia: from Yeltsin to
Putin. Stefan Kreutzenberger, Sabine Grabovsky, Utta Unzer. P. 143.
