Rauf Mirkadirov
Political correspondent, "Zerkalo" daily (Azerbaijan)
The legitimacy of power is not the decisive factor in the settlement
of conflicts
The problem of the legitimacy of power exists in all three states of the South
Caucasus, to different degrees. The oppositions in these states consider the very
absence of the legitimacy of power to be the main cause of existing and emerging
unsolved problems. Let us try to examine to what extent this hypothesis conforms
to reality by providing concrete examples of the development of internal political
events in all three countries of the South Caucasus.
At the end of 1991, then, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia became independent
states. The government in each of these states had already achieved different
degrees of legitimacy by that time, both from the point view of its succession
and genesis in democratic and fair elections, and from the point of view of adequate
societal perception.
The situation regarding legitimacy was much worse in Azerbaijan than in the
two other states of the South Caucasus. Former First Secretary of the Communist
Party Ayaz Mutalibov was the president of Azerbaijan. He became the head of state
in the early fall of 1991, following rigged elections that took place after the
failed August coup d'etat in Moscow. The parliament of Azerbaijan was not perceived
by society as a legitimate legislative authority, either. The fact is that the
parliamentary elections for the then Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan took place under
the conditions of a state of emergency declared in the second half of 1990. Thus
the highest government bodies in Azerbaijan were legitimate only from the point
of view of succession-- figuratively speaking, from the point of view of succession
to the throne - but not more.
In Georgia and Armenia a rather different situation had arisen by that time.
In both countries, to a sufficient extent, a legitimate government had been formed,
there were no questions about succession, genesis in democratic and fair elections,
and adequate societal perception. The parliamentary and presidential elections
in these countries were held based on the laws adopted by the previous state structures,
and under their relative control, and without any upheavals. Thus, succession
was observed.
At that time, in Georgia and Armenia, representatives of the opposition in
the persons of the leaders of national movements - Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Levon
Ter-Petrossian --prevailed, which indicates that the first elections there were
relatively democratic and fair. As a result, in both Georgia and in Armenia, the
new leadership enjoyed the confidence of society. Therefore, unlike in Azerbaijan,
the leadership in Georgia and Armenia, by were prepared, by the degree of their
legitimacy, to solve the problems facing their countries. But we will us examine
how they availed themselves of this opportunity.
After gaining independence, Azerbaijan, too, attempted to settle the issue of
the legitimacy of power. Later on, such attempts became an "unpleasant"
tradition in all South Caucasian states. The essence of this form of establishing
a legitimate power is as follows:
First, in one way or another, the leadership is overthrown, and then elections
are held following the overthrow to simply legally formalize the fait accompli.
In May 1992 the opposition forced Ayaz Mutalibov to resign. In essence, a coup
d'etat was staged. But the so-called Popular Front did not have the courage to
take power (into its own hands). Formally, power was transferred to the Chairman
of the Supreme Soviet, Yagub Mamedov, who had no political support among society.
New presidential elections were called for. But in May 1992 the ex-President
"recovered" power for one day. The next day the Popular Front staged
a counter-coup, and dismissed not only Mutalibov, but Mamedov as well. Power passed
completely into the hands of the Popular Front.
In essence, the presidential election set for early June became a mere formality.
In the absence of serious challengers, the leader of the Popular Front, Abulfaz
Elchibey, won the election. Even so, the 1992 presidential election was nevertheless
relatively fair. Besides, the majority of the population of Azerbaijan pinned
their hopes for a better future on the new government led by Elchibey. The new
leadership was relatively legitimate from the point of view of its genesis in
democratic and fair elections, and the adequate perception by society, but not
from the point of view of its succession to power.
Thus, the situation regarding the legitimacy of power that existed in early
June 1992 was approximately the same in all three South Caucasian states. But,
as the events and processes that unfolded later have shown, this contributed neither
to the settlement of existing conflicts, nor to the development of the societies
there. Less than a year later, we witnessed new coups d'etat in Georgia and Azerbaijan,
as a result of which former party bureaucrats Edward Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliyev
came to power in both countries.
Hhowever strange it may seem, in both cases relatively legitimate governments
were overthrown because of the escalation of on-going regional conflicts, which
thanks to incitement by outside forces had been transformed into internal political
clashes. That is to say, neither in Georgia nor in Azerbaijan had the creation
of legitimate power contributed to resolving the conflicts.
However, one must acknowledge that in the downfall of the governments of both
Gamsakhurdia and Elchibey, a subjective factor related to the personality of these
leaders played a role of no small importance. These men remained dissidents even
while in power. This is exactly how one of the vice-prime ministers in Gamsakhurdia's
government described the first president of independent Georgia on the eve of
his overthrow: Gamsakhurhia was not ruling, he was fighting a battle.
Something similar occurred in Azerbaijan as well. During his address to the
Popular Front convention, dissatisfied by the situation in the country, President
Elchibey threatened to his fellow-party members to quit his post and go into opposition.
But these, however, are particulars that don't change the essence of the events.
The President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, remained in power longer than
the other South Caucasian democrats. But this was hardly due to his legitimacy.
His image as a "victor" played an enormous role in his longevity, as
did the fact that for a long time, the figure of Ter-Petrossian was convenient
for the Kremlin.
In 1996 Ter-Petrossian falsified the results of the presidential election and
thereby completely lost legitimacy from the point of view of adequate societal
perception. This did not prevent him from retaining his position of power. But
as soon as he attempted to abandon the role of the victor, to slightly change
his foreign policy priorities and to conclude a peace treaty, which would somewhat
take into account the interests of Azerbaijan, Ter-Petrossian suffered the same
fate as his fellow first-generation democrats Gamsakhurdia and Elchibey. And in
Armenia, too, in essence, a coup d'etat was staged. The subsequent election, as
a result of which Robert Kocharian became president, merely legally formalized
a fait accompli.
In connection, as is revealed by the events that developed in Azerbaijan, and
by the evaluations of these events that were circulated in Azerbaijan, it was
not the lack of legitimacy that prevented Ter-Petrossian from being able to realize
his plan of settling the Karabakh conflict, or to be more precise - to impose
it on society. Most probably the principal cause of the overthrow of Ter-Petrossian
was his attempt to surrender his trump card - the image of the victor. From this
angle, it is not by accident that it was Robert Kocharian who replaced him, a
president and who was inferior to Ter-Petrossian in all aspects, except in that
Kocharian was a war hero, that is to say, more of a victor than his predecessor.
After the June 1993 coup d'etat, Heydar Aliyev came to power in Azerbaijan.
One cannot categorize the presidential elections held in the fall 1993 as democratic,
free and fair. Yet for many reasons Aliyev, unlike any of his predecessors, had
maximum legitimacy in terms of public perception. Even so, he could go no further
than the signing of a cease-fire agreement in 1994. In 1999 when everybody was
talking about the possibility of signing a treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
three high-ranking state officials left Aliyev's team at once -the minister for
foreign affairs, the state adviser on foreign policy, and head of the secretariat
of the president's administration. Almost the same processes took place in Georgia
under Shevardnadze.
Today Levon Ter-Petrossian is again trying to become the legitimate president--
head of state of Armenia --through a victory in the upcoming presidential elections
of 2003. In addition, his supporters openly declare that if they return to power,
they will agree to the step-by-step settlement of the Karabakh conflict. It is
as though Ter-Petrossian seeks to receive a mandate from the people for this variant
of the settlement of the conflict.
That would not be bad. But unfortunately the ex-president might be seriously
mistaken in his calculations. The fact is that the electorate will most likely
vote not for one version of the settlement of the Karabakh conflict or another,
but against Robert Kocharian. Judging from the assertions of Ter-Petrossian supporters,
the majority of the Armenian people are already sick of Kocharian.
From this point of view, a story about granting independence to Algeria is
worthy of note. General de Gaulle won the election with blunt colonial slogans.
But later on, he granted independence to Algeria - a French colony, although he
had received from the people a mandate to do the opposite. But he withstood the
onset of popular outrage, remained in power, and had his own way.
There is a fresher example from the history of Israel, but of the opposite
nature. Barak allegedly came to power after receiving from the people a mandate
for peace with the Palestinians. But strange as it may seem, the same people in
"union" with the Palestinians forced him to retire when he attempted
to implement his initiatives, although Barak was prepared to sign the most acceptable
peace with the Palestinians.
Thus, neither the degree of legitimacy of the government itself, nor even the
degree of legitimacy of certain initiatives aimed at conflict resolution can sufficiently
guarantee their implementation. In the conditions that exist in the South Caucasus,
complete legitimacy and the regular transfer of power are the most likely guarantees
for the development of democracy and civil society. Otherwise the states of the
South Caucasus will simply never rid themselves of a sequence of coups d'etat,
and will be completely mired in corruption and bribery, much more so than in today's
Azerbaijan and Armenia, and in Georgia as well. Otherwise these states will never
become economically developed and prosperous. Because after all, the ongoing conflicts
and complete lack of socio-political, economic, and institutional structurization
of society is a breeding ground for both the blights mentioned above, and for
authoritarianism.
There is further evidence for the assertion that the establishment of democratic
civil society will not contribute much to the settlement of the conflict. One
can recall the experience of the Western democratic states with their highly developed
civil society. France has for several centuries now been unable to solve the problem
of Caledonia; Great Britain - that of the Northern Ireland. Not to mention the
problem of the Basques in Spain. The point is that any society reacts in an extremely
painful way to interethnic, inter-religious and territorial conflicts, and to
the initiatives aimed at their settlement. In this connection, even the most democratic
and civil society becomes, as a rule, an object of manipulation by political forces
in their struggle for power, who play on the "loser's complex".
From our perspective, the other way around, settlement of the conflicts can
contribute to the establishment of civil societies in the countries of the South
Caucasus. If this is the case, one of the serious factors permitting the manipulation
of society will disappear. After all, it is not by chance that after September
11 many in the West began to accuse the leadership of the US of retreating from
the principles of civil society.
And finally, it is unrealistic to expect considerable results in connection
with conflict resolution from the states of the South Caucasus' membership in
European structures. First, the international community doesn't have concrete
recipes and/or principles for the settlement of such territorial, interethnic
and religious conflicts. Depending on the specific situation, international organizations
sometimes apply the principle of territorial integrity, sometimes the principle
of the self-determination of nations. Very recently, the principle of self-determination
was applied to East Timor. But the international community doesn't demand that
France grant independence to New Caledonia, Spain to Catalonia, or Great Britain
to Northern Ireland. In other words, in each particular case the international
community offers recipes depending on "existing realities" and the interests
of leading powers.
It is exactly for this reason that in relation to the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict, the principle of the inadmissibility of military aggression for the
solution of similar problems and the right of a state to repulse an aggressor
has not been applied, in this case to Armenia. Because this would not conform
to either "existing realities" or to the interests of leading powers,
first of all, Russia. International organizations, including European ones, so
far have not recognized the fact of the aggression of Armenia toward Azerbaijan.
At the same time, these organizations, in the form of the Council of Europe,
have imposed on Azerbaijan the obligation to settle the Karabakh conflict exclusively
through peaceful means. But Armenia should not delude itself. It is necessary
to take into account that "existing realities" as well as the interests
of the leading powers (similarly) are not permanent.
That is why, for the first time since the beginning of the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict, in a draft resolution of the Council of Europe, the fact of the occupation
of Azerbaijani territory by Armenia was recognized.
Thus, one can come to the following general conclusion:
Neither the legitimacy and democracy of the leadership, nor the development of
civil society, nor membership in European international organizations, nor even
the presence of all these factors simultaneously, open the way for the settlement
of the conflict.
This should not be seen as a display of fatalism. On the contrary: The settlement
of the conflicts, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in particular, is possible
under the following conditions:
First, the parties get completely sick of both the war and the conflict in
general. Then there is the realization that any victory might be Pyrrhic, as well.
At this stage, there is no sense of fatigue about the conflict in Azerbaijan.
But there does exist an anxiety about the possibility of the resumption of military
activity. There is no confidence within society about the preparedness of the
country for war. But in Armenia, at least some people have begun to realize that
the country is on the verge of a Pyrrhic victory. It is precisely because of the
conflict that Armenia remains on the periphery of all large-scale regional economic
projects and lags behind not only Azerbaijan but even Georgia in terms of development.
The first sign of this understanding was the consent of Levon Ter-Petrossian to
a step-by-step settlement.
Second, strong, determined leaders like general de Gaulle come to power, leaders
who are capable of taking responsibility for signing a peace accord which is not
adequately understood by the public of the conflicting sides. So far there are
no such leaders.
Third, one of the parties acknowledges defeat, which is officially formalized
by a corresponding peace treaty recognized by the international community. From
this perspective, official Yerevan is, at first glance, in a more advantageous
position. After all, it is Armenia that at the moment of the introduction of the
cease-fire occupied nearly 20 per cent of the territory of Azerbaijan territory.
However, significantly, Azerbaijan has no intention of acknowledging defeat in
the conflict, and the international organizations and leading powers, even Yerevan's
closest ally Russia, are not interested in the legal formalization of the results
of aggression to the benefit of Armenia.
Fourth, the interests of the leading powers, first of all of the USA and Russia,
coincide completely at a certain phase. They impose on the conflicting sides,
naturally under the aegis of international organizations (OSCE or UN), some specific
plan for the settlement.
The last option is less preferable, because it will take into consideration
chiefly the interests of the leading powers themselves, but not of the conflicting
sides.
Nevertheless I am optimistic, and I imagine that if there is a version of the
settlement of the conflict which even relatively well suits both sides, peace
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis could be more stable and lasting than peace
that might occur, for instance, between Catholics and Protestants in Northern
Ireland.
And this is not a question of a commonality of mentality or tradition. What
is important, it seems to me, is that Azerbaijanis are most tolerant in every
respect, and that the Armenians adjust to new situations very well and very quickly.
But so far, oddly enough, Azerbaijanis have displayed momentary, situational
aggressiveness, and Armenians extreme passion, contradicting the usual traits
of these peoples, and driving them to perpetually struggle to expand their "living
space", the moment an opportunity arises...
