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Rauf Radjabov
Simurg Cultural Association of Azerbaijan |
The South Caucasus on the Crossroads of Geopolitical Interests
For three hundred years now, since the 18th century, the South Caucasus has
been the focus of intense interest for regional and world powers. Today, the region
is becoming more and more an object of globalization, and the states are being
pulled into this process from different directions. By virtue of its geographic
situation, the South Caucasus is a zone of political interest for Russia and the
US. On the whole these interests consist of the following issues:
1. improvement of geopolitical positions;
2. access to energy resources and thoroughfares;
3. attainment of global security;
4. creation of a new system of mutual relations.
As of today, the United States is a great world power, whereas Russia, since
the downfall of the Soviet Union, has acquiring the status of regional state.
In order to comprehend more profoundly the ongoing processes in the region it
is necessary to explore the common and differing approaches of these countries
to the South Caucasus.
Russia is attempting to restore its previous position. With the exception of
the Baltic states, it continues to view the area of the former USSR as territories
of its special geopolitical interest, where outside influence is inadmissible
without its prior knowledge. The process of the conquest of the Caucasus had occurred
over three centuries, while the loss by Russia of its positions in the newly independent
South Caucasian republics occurred overnight.
To our great regret, Russian geopolitical claims to the South Caucasian states
express themselves through its military presence, and where this is no longer
the case, through attempts to make up for the loss. The US is more pragmatic in
its actions; the rules of the game it offers are more clear and concrete, since
they are based on economic factors, implying a partnership. The desire of the
newly independent South Caucasian states, in particular of Azerbaijan and Georgia,
to have stable and constructive relations with Russia, is present here. They continue
to be wary of Russia for historically obvious reasons. The South Caucasian republics
do not pose a threat to the territorial integrity of Russia. Consequently, in
its relations with the states of the South Caucasus, Russia has no problem of
losing its territory.
In contrast to Russia, the United States wishes to be present in the South
Caucasus as a partner during both the realization of various social-economic projects
and the resolution of the problems of achieving global security.
Russia is too weak politically to completely block the access of "outside
forces" to the region. Russia is too poor economically to "exploit"
the South Caucasus with its strength. Otherwise, the North Caucasus, which belongs
to Russia, would have already become a flourishing land, which would have been
advantageous both to the South Caucasus and Russia itself. Enormous Russia must
acknowledge and draw a conclusion from the fact that the South Caucasian republics,
particularly Azerbaijan, are becoming economically powerful. Therefore, Russia
should put the North Caucasus on its feet rather than engage in attempts to reanimate
its bygone status as a world power.
It is no secret that the instability in the South Caucasian region directly
affects the situation in the Russian North Caucasus, complicating the situation
in the frontier areas of the country.
Hence Russia's aspiration for a military presence in the region. In contrast
to Russia, which in fact does not invest anything in the region, the US is objectively
interested in the fastest settlement of the conflicts in the South Caucasus, since
if political stability and regional security is achieved, it will be possible
here to count on reliable guarantees for foreign investments, implement large-scale
projects aimed at the creation of several oil- and gas pipeline networks, and
revive the transport communication systems along the Great Silk Road. All these
steps will contribute to the development of the infrastructure, as well as to
the increased well-being of the nations of the entire South Caucasus. But as of
today, unfortunately, we are confronted with a different situation and a different
understanding: whoever controls all the railroad, gas- and oil-pipeline transportation
flows, whoever controls airspace, will gain in the geopolitical sense.
The struggle of the two players does not provide the chance for the settlement
of the conflicts in the South Caucasus. There are forces in Russia that prefer
that the Caspian energy resources not be exploited and transported at all if it
does not completely control these processes. The control of transportation of
energy resources is important for Russia exactly from the point of view of the
return to its superpower status. From our point of view, conversely, the beginning
of the utilization of energy and mineral resources of the South Caucasus will
lead to prosperity, will generate in the region a sense of stability and security.
And that in turn will give foreign investors the opportunity to finance various
social-economic projects in the economically underdeveloped frontier areas of
Russia.
The other negative factor is the obstacles Russia puts in the road of Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Armenia into Europe. And this is occurring because Russia itself has
not yet decided whether it needs to integrate into Europe. As a result, an amusing
situation arises: the United States is pulling the South Caucasian states into
Europe, and Russia, under itself. Because of these contradictions the South Caucasus
is being divided into to axes: West-East (the US, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan)
and North-South (Russia, Armenia, Iran).
The United States offers a policy of geopolitical pluralism. This appears in
the models put forth to the states of the South Caucasus. Russia advances a model
of the "Caucasian Four", but does not substantiate it with socio-economic
factors. And the US together with the European community puts forward "The
South Caucasian Stability and Security Pact", which was developed by the
Brussels Center for European Political Studies in May 2000. This document represents
a sizeable elaboration of the future integration of the South Caucasus into the
European community, and contains a number of ideas on the issues of conflict prevention
and conflict resolution, integration, and regional security systems.
I am a supporter of a model that can be conditionally called "a wide economic
axis". This model could unite the US, Russia and Europe, i.e. unite the Caucasus,
the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. It is appropriate to recall here such a formation
as GUUAM (Georgia - Ukraine - Uzbekistan - Azerbaijan - Moldova). It might be
desirable that Russia and other interested South Caucasian states take part in
this project. However, the contradictory and unstable policy of Russia vis-à-vis
our region runs counter to the interests of the South Caucasian states. The recent
positive shifts in relations with Azerbaijan (the signing of a comprehensive treaty
on friendship and cooperation between the two states and the agreement on the
status of the Caspian Sea) and Russia's attempts to normalize relations with Georgia
give us hope that the Russian policy in the South Caucasus will become more flexible
and multifaceted.
There exists one aspect in the relations between the countries of the South
Caucasus with Russia that is absent from their relations with the United States.
This is migration from the states of the South Caucasus to Russia.
After the declarations of independence, hundreds of thousands of Russian-speaking
people from the region moved to Russia, which adversely affected the economic
life of the states of the region and created additional problems for Russia (accommodation
and employment of the Russian-speaking migrants, etc.). But there is a more significant
problem - the labor migration phenomenon. Over the last eight years, between 2
and 2.5 million Azerbaijanis have left Azerbaijan for Moscow in search of work.
Natives of rural areas are predominant among the labor migrants, and the number
of refugees and forcibly displaced persons has increased as well. Before the August
1998 financial crisis in Russia, Azerbaijanis had been transferring up to $2.5
billion into the republic annually. After the crisis this amount decreased to
$700-800 million annually.
According to various data, up to one million people have left Armenia for Russia,
and the number of people who have left Georgia ranges from 500 thousand to one
million. It seems to me that these numbers are significant proof that the states
of the South Caucasus and Russia are doomed to normal, good relations. This testifies
that both Russia and the states of the South Caucasus have interests that intersect.
All those on whom the complete settlement of the existing unsolved problems depends
must take into consideration the balance of power and do everything possible in
this direction.
The events of September 11, 2001 served as a real catalyst for geopolitical
and geostrategic processes in the South Caucasus. It is appropriate to recall
here the Trabzon Agreement on strategic cooperation to ensure the security of
the energy corridor signed in April 2002 by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. This
agreement embraces a broad spectrum of issues, from the joint fight against terrorism
and aggressive separatism to the problems of money-laundering and the protection
of export pipelines.
In my opinion, the strengthening of US influence in the South Caucasian region
since September 11 has upset the existing geopolitical balance of power and interests,
serving as an additional factor in antagonism and the impossibility of a speedy
and overall settlement of all interethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Russia
was one of the earliest to respond to the call by US President George W. Bush
to join in the global counter-terrorist campaign, which is a positive step in
the cause of strengthening security in both the world as a whole and the South
Caucasian region.
Russia provided the United States with necessary information on the location
of the strategic installations of the Taliban and rendered timely military-technical
assistance to the Northern Alliance. This and other facts enabled the allies to
conduct a rapid and successful counter-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. Later
on, however, some contradictions appeared.
First, Russian military operations in Chechnya were "legitimized".
If before September 11, these operations had raised universal protest from the
US, the EU, and Turkey, afterwards, criticism of the military operations began
to decline. However, it is also necessary to acknowledge the fact that Chechnya
is a part of Russian territory, and no one should call the territorial integrity
of Russia into question. This is a principle of international law and international
relations.
Second, since September 11, the American influence in the region has acquired
an increasingly concrete shape. Besides the financial resources that are being
invested in various oil and transportation projects, the US has begun to render
military-technical assistance to the states of the South Caucasus. And this cannot
but arouse the ire of Russia.
Third is the potential enlargement of NATO towards the South. It is appropriate
to recall Stephen Sestanovich's turn of phrase: "… the central direction
of NATO has turned into the 'central flank', and the Southern direction into the
'flanking center'".
It is also necessary to note Georgia's desire to join NATO and the presence
of Russian military bases in Armenia. None of these factors can have a positive
impact on the overall situation in the South Caucasus.
It is my deep conviction that the South Caucasian states have two options:
1. Complete demilitarization of the South Caucasian region;
2. Simultaneous accession of all three states into NATO.
Fourth is the problem of Iraq. It must be admitted that without solving the
problem of terrorism as well as the problem of countries supporting terrorism
and terrorists, there is no reason for anybody to talk and think about global
security in their territory.
Therefore, the demands by the international community that Iraq destroy its
stocks of chemical and bacteriological weapons and fully reveal all the details
of its nuclear program are completely grounded. But here, too, not everything
is as simple as it seems at first sight. In fact, the decision taken by the US
and Russia on Iraq will test the strength of the anti-terrorist coalition. In
no circumstance should any of the members of the coalition substitute its own
decisions for the UN resolutions. All the decisions and resolutions must correspond
to the spirit and the letter of the law, and the laws of international relations
are the principles of international law.
