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Sergei Shakaryants
Armenian Center for Strategic and National Studies (Armenia) |
Different conflicts with the same base
The present-day conflicts in the South Caucasus are the logical continuation
of interethnic problems that originated and accumulated over several centuries.
In order to manage the harsh legacy of the Russian Empire that fell to their lot,
the Bolsheviks implemented the principle of "autonomization". As a result
of this approach, instead of a genuine equality of nations and peoples, a de facto
inequality was constitutionally fixed in many respects arbitrarily, without taking
into account specific historical and legal preconditions, as the territories were
divided into "union" and "autonomous" republics, "autonomous
regions/oblasts" and "districts/okrugs". President of the Russian
Federation Vladimir Putin acknowledged this in the course of his official visit
to Azerbaijan (January 9-11, 2001) by stating that the problems existing today
in the South Caucasus "were inherited from the Empire", under the pressure
of which they had been "driven into a corner" and now "floated
to the surface". The national demarcation by the communists resulted in an
imbalance between the principles of historical justice, economic incentive and
expediency, as well as geographic interdependence.
Against this general background it is necessary to distinguish the problems
of the Armenian people and subsequently Russian-Armenian relations. Unfortunately,
the interests of Armenia were crudely trampled by Bolshevist Russia and sacrificed
for the sake of the anti-human false theory of the Russian Bolsheviks concerning
the export of the socialist revolution to the entire world. Documents in the historical
archive are preserved testifying that Russia was presupposing the export of the
socialist revolution by means of the "Bolshevisation" of Kemalist Turkey
as the flagship of the Moslem East. The creation of the "Red Orient"
in its turn was considered by the communists as the first and most important step
for the unlimited export of Bolshevism all over the world. That is why Armenia
and its territories were merely a bargaining chip for the Bolsheviks in their
dealings with Turkey and Azerbaijan. In our opinion, herein lies the cause of
yet another dismemberment of Armenia by the Bolsheviks and the Turks, and the
annexation of its territories (the Cars and Nakhijevan regions, Gardmank, the
Kazakh district, etc.) in favor of Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The disregard of conventional criteria for the determination of interethnic
borders in this region with diverse populations resulted in the distortion of
the very principle of the economic expediency of any given demarcation in the
South Caucasus. As a result it was evident by the seventies and eighties of the
20th century that following the overall deterioration of the economic situation
in the USSR, for example, the Azerbaijani population of Nakhijevan and the former
Elisavetpol province (now the western part of Azerbaijan with its center in Ganja,
historically - Gandzak, Kirovabad) was buying essential goods not in Baku but
in neighboring Armenia and Georgia.
All of this gives occasion to lay most of the blame. for the armed conflicts
that flared up in the South Caucasus at the beginning of perestroika (1985-1988)
on the Bolshevik and later on the Soviet leadership, not in the least forgetting
that these conflicts had not been not settled before their time either. For example,
as many political scientists who turned to the origins of the Karabakh problem
noted at that time and in the subsequent years, "the on-going perestroika
contributed to the 'unfreezing' of the long- standing conflict and transition
into an active phase". This statement is applicable both to the Georgian-Abkhazian
and the Georgian-Ossetian conflicts.
It must be noted that with respect to Karabakh this statement only partially
reflects reality. The truth is that to some extent the tense situation around
Karabakh had lasted throughout the entire existence of the USSR and was not a
surprise for the central government. The Politburo of the Central Committee of
the CPUS was well informed that before 1920 this territory had been governed by
the local Armenian National Council, and that in this region in 1918-1920 military
operations had taken place uninterruptedly between the Armenians and the Turkish
"Caucasian Tatars", allied with the regular Army of Turkey. The Armenian
National Council of Artsakh (Karabakh) was guided by the first Armenian republic,
and the Caucasian Tatars by Turkey, in which connection they were receiving direct
military assistance both from the Young Turks and from the Kemalists. It was also
well known to the leadership of the USSR that even the League of Nations, predecessor
of the UN, in which Armenia was a member (pre-Soviet Azerbaijan has never been
admitted to the League of Nations as a full member), in due course recognized
Karabakh as a disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thus, in essence,
if the South Caucasus had not been Sovietized, then sooner or later the League
of Nations would have organized and conducted in the territory of Karabakh a plebiscite
such as were held after the World War I in a number of disputed regions in Europe.
Thus, let us emphasize that at the base of all contemporary conflicts in the
South Caucasus lies a big complex of multi-faceted problems, inherited by the
nations of the region from preceding eras. Nevertheless, these conflicts do not
have very many common features. Let us say the movement of the Karabakh Armenians
was caused, in the first place, by the strong emotional stress accumulated over
the period of being part of Azerbaijan. The impetus of the Armenians became stronger
after the anti-Armenian pogroms in various Azerbaijani cities. This awoke the
historical memory of the nation, which felt the coming of yet another national
catastrophe - similar to the Armenian genocide in Turkey in 1915. And the hopes
the Armenians pinned on Russia and the world community as well were connected
not only with their aspiration to make the Karabakh problem topical as an independent
issue in regional policy. One can presume that a significant portion of the Armenians
associated the Artsakh problem, to a certain extent, with the "Armenian question"
- a problem of 18th -19th century world politics dealing with the creation of
an independent Armenian state.
At the same time the Karabakhis in the Karabakh problem, like the Ossetians
in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, have the urge to be present, to overcome the
condition of a divided nation and to unite with the part of the nation that lives
in a state entity with a higher international-legal status. Finally for the Armenians
of NKR, the realization of the idea of "miatsum" (unification) was not
of such vital importance as the possibility of getting away from the control of
Baku and gaining independence (de-facto or de jure).
In this connection, it is absolutely obvious that any large-scale defeat was
fraught for NKR with the partition or even complete liquidation of the republic:
the removal of the entire population of Karabakh (through physical elimination
or escape to Armenia and other countries). And the risk level for the Azerbaijani
side, naturally, was (and is) substantially lower: even in the most adverse circumstances
Baku had (and has) wider opportunities for maneuvering and retreat.
The Armenians of Karabakh are in many respects uncompromising exactly because
of the tough limit of alternatives for conflict settlement. The leaders of Azerbaijan
and the international mediators, including the representatives of Russia, have
quite often faulted the leadership of NKR for this uncompromising position.
Standing apart is the Abkhazian conflict, caused by the struggle for restoration
of the lost highest (within the framework of the USSR) state-legal status. First,
from a purely historical point of view, Abkhazia has quite forceful arguments
for demanding sovereignty and full, unconditional secession from Georgia. From
March 4, 1921 Aphasia had the status of Soviet Socialist republic and was not
part of Georgia. With the establishment on December 30, 1922 of the TSFSR (Transcaucasian
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), the Abkhazian SSR became part of the USSR,
and only on April 17, 1930 the Union-member status of Abkhazia was liquidated
and the republic was "made" part of Georgia in the capacity of its autonomy
(ASSR). The main subtlety of the steps enumerated is that, as in the case of Karabakh
and Azerbaijan, the issue of the administrative subordination of Abkhazia was
decided by Moscow unilaterally. And naturally if Abkhazia could have kept its
status as a Union republic until 1991, along with the others it would have obtained
independence from the Soviet Union as it broke up. Another distinctive feature
of the Abkazian conflict is the wide participation (even in comparison with the
Ossetian-Georgian confrontation) of the South Caucasian nations.
First of all, in spite of the nationalistic character of the Gamsakhurdia regime,
under his leadership the situation in Abkhazia remained quite calm for a long
time. And what is more, Gamsakhurdia even contributed to the election of Vladislav
Ardzinba, one of the leaders of the Abkhazian liberation movement, as the chairman
of the Abkhazian parliament (December 1990). In contrast to the South Ossetian
problem, the Abkhazian problem became more acute right after the overthrow of
president Gamsakhurdia and the return of Shevardnadze to Georgia, when under the
conditions of the weakening control of Tbilisi, the Abkhazian national leaders
attempted to consolidate and expand the autonomous status of the republic. Perhaps
the most cardinal distinction of the Karabakh-Azerbaijani conflict from similar
Transcaucasian problems is that the population of Artsakh formalized the Act of
its cessation from Azerbaijan in full conformity with the Law on the Right to
Secede from the USSR, already valid and in force. Let us point out in this connection
that first Azerbaijan proclaimed the restoration of the succession of the Democratic
Republic of Azerbaijan (DRA) that existed at the beginning of the 20th century,
and in fact rejected the legacy of the Azerbaijani SSR. And only thereafter, at
the joint session of the Council of People's Deputies of All Levels, did the Armenians
of the NKAO and the Shahumian district adopt their Declaration on the sovereignty
of NKR.
As is well known, the above-mentioned all-Union Law stipulated the right to
self-determination of national autonomies, and even territories of compact residence
of national minorities not having autonomy, in cases in which the Union republic
achieved the right to secede from the USSR. Besides, qualifying itself as a successor
of the DRA, present-day Azerbaijan in fact voluntarily relinquished its rights
to Karabakh, since in 1918-1920, as we indicated above, the territory of the latter
was not part of Azerbaijan. That is to say, especially from the legal perspective,
the act of self-determination of the Armenians of NKR, confirmed by the nation-wide
independence referendum (December 1991) held after the adoption of the Declaration
of sovereignty, is absolutely blameless.
The South Caucasian conflicts differ also in terms of Russia's attitude toward
them. The historical links of Russia with these conflicts are interesting, too.
The problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however strange it may sound, are
in the first place interconnected with the establishment of Russian domination
in the North but not the South Caucasus, as well as with the acute antagonism
between Russia and Turkey. The conflict around Karabakh and the Lezghin problem,
however, trace back to the history of the liberation by Russia of Eastern Armenia
and a number of Persian vassal khanates in Transcaucasia. During the first years
of Sovietization, Russia already played a decisive role in determining the status
of Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Subsequently as the successor of the
Russian Empire and the USSR, the Russian Federation, along with the nations of
the South Caucasus, bears before the world community the responsibility for peace,
stability and security here.
At various stages of its involvement in the conflicts and their settlements,
Moscow has had different tasks. For example, starting from the point that the
CIS itself was invented within the context of the possible painless "divorce"
of the former Soviet republics, one can assert that at the first stage it was
important for Russia to "retreat" from the South Caucasus with minimal
strategic losses. Later on a different objective was pursued - the restoration
here of Russian positions, including military ones, in order to ensure the security
of the South Caucasus. Not infrequently the predominant ideas and motives for
Russian actions were not only, or not so much, the settlement of the conflicts,
as not allowing the access to the South Caucasus of "third states".
Otherwise this would inevitably lead to the transformation of the region into
a base for a more "material" geopolitical rivalry with Moscow in the
territory of Russia itself.
But on the whole, Russian policy, including its attitude toward the problem
of NKR, has not distinguished itself by resoluteness and consistency. And at the
moment of the outbreak of the conflict and in the following years, even Russian
researchers were expressing the opinion that "the eastern policy of Russia
that was called up to serve as an important component of the entire foreign state
activity is experiencing, like the country as a whole, by far not the best of
times. Its Caucasian direction today has reached a deadlock which it will be not
at all simple to get out of". Moreover, this is most clearly manifested with
respect to the Karabakh problem, which has its own genesis, internal logic of
development, protracted history and long-standing previous history. In this history,
deeply rooted in ancient times, the clearly expressed pro-Russian orientation
of the Armenians of Artsakh/Karabakh has always been dominant.
The same applies in principle to the problems of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Nevertheless in these conflicts as well Russia has not demonstrated firmness of
purpose or clear guiding lines. Because of this, many political and public circles
in the states of the South Caucasus and in Russia itself fear that "in the
not distant future Russia risks losing the entire Caucasus". And only with
president Putin's coming to power in the Russian Federation, is there at last
in the Caucasian policy of Moscow a clear and well-defined "reminder"
resounding for all the interested parties that Russia has been, is and shall be
a "Caucasian power".
Let us return to Russia's involvement in South Caucasian affairs, including
peacemaking. For example, settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia, and to
some extent the resistance in Abkhazia, is mainly attempted on the basis of the
Agreement on groups of observers and collective peacekeeping forces in the "hot
spots" of the CIS, signed in Kiev on March 20, 1992 at the Council of the
Heads of State-Members of the CIS. However, later on, at the insistence of Georgia,
the consideration of the Abkhazian conflict was taken out of the CIS framework
and became part of UN peacekeeping activity. At the same time, the attempts of
Azerbaijan and Armenia to bring the Karabakh conflict into the UN did not meet
with understanding either in Russia or in the UN itself. It was clearly stipulated
(and this was subsequently repeatedly emphasized by the representatives of Russia,
the United States and France) that the situation around Karabakh would be considered
and the approaches towards the settlement of the conflict would be elaborated
solely by the OSCE.
As of Fall 2002, the South Caucasian conflicts and their resolution continue
to remain at the previously defined levels of international involvement. In this
involvement Russia has had, and continues to have, a large share, which neither
the conflicting sides, nor the international mediators, nor the partners in the
settlement of these conflicts are able to revise. There is a multitude of reasons
for this, but perhaps one of the main reasons is the geographic and consequently
strategic proximity of Russia to the zones of ongoing as well as potential conflicts
in the South Caucasus. This in its turn determines the dependence of the conflicting
sides on the moods reigning in the highest political circles in Russia.
It is absolutely clear that the restoration of the previous status quo in the
internal state structure of Georgia and Azerbaijan by force will be either impossible
or extraordinarily difficult. Since the moment of the establishment of the cease-fire
regimes in NKR, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not enough time has passed to begin
to restore even the level of confidence that existed between the nations during
the Soviet period. On the other hand, it is obvious that in the three main conflicts
each mother republic suffered military defeat because, above all, a category of
people quite new for Transcaucasia but well known in world politics- " the
armed nation" was fighting against them.
There are several other substantial factors testifying to the general unsettledness
of interethnic relations in the South Caucasus. These are the Mengrelian, the
Adjarian, the Kistinian, the Talish, the Lezgin, and the Georgian-Azerbaijani
questions. To some degree they are real problems and, in our opinion, they may
be considered "smouldering conflicts". They can flare up and transform
into the military operations practically at any moment. The defining aspect is
the maturing (or the creation) of some dangerously explosive situation in the
regions in question of the South Caucasus, as well as the existence of the political
will on the part of outside forces to employ the accumulated conflict potential
for certain objectives.
